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I. INTRODUCTION
Cayuga Harvester, a large-scale farmer, purchased a harvesting
machine from Allis-Chalmers.' The machine malfunctioned and
Cayuga was unable to harvest its crop.2 When Cayuga sued for
* William K. Jones is the Milton Handler Professor of Trade Regulation at Columbia
University School of Law.
1. Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1983).
2. Id. at 7, 465 N.Y.S..2d at 609.
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breach of warranty, seeking $10 million for its lost crop, Allis-Chal-
mers relied on a contractual provision that excluded recovery of con-
sequential damages of this kind.3 The court observed that allowance
of Cayuga's claim could result in a recovery many times the purchase
price of the machine and that "[ilt defies reason to suppose that [Allis-
Chalmers] could have intended to assume such risks."4 The court
sustained the contractual limitation on liability even though it was
shown that Cayuga had no choice in the matter; all farm machinery
manufacturers insisted on contractual provisions excluding conse-
quential damages.5
Cayuga also sought recovery in negligence and in strict product
liability.6 These claims were rejected on the ground that the wasting
or spoilage of crops was mere "economic loss" not subject to recovery
in tort.7 Yet, it is clear that if Cayuga's harvester had exploded,
rather than broken down, and if Cayuga's crops had been consumed
by an ensuing fire, rather than left to rot in the fields, a claim could
have been asserted in product liability (if the machine had been defec-
tive) and in negligence (if the machine had been carelessly made).'
Any effort to limit such a tort claim by a contractual stipulation
would have encountered hostility in the courts.9
Why should these two types of claims be subject to different anal-
yses? The losses to Cayuga are the same in both instances: one
inoperable harvester and one lost crop. Moreover, in Cayuga's case,
there was a contract between the parties that explicitly allocated risk
and placed the burden of these losses on Cayuga. This contractual
stipulation referred to both contract and tort.10
Section II of this Article briefly examines the warranties pro-
vided in the Uniform Commercial Code and the extent to which such
warranties may be limited by contract. Section III analyzes the tort
actions that are available to commercial buyers who purchase defec-
tive products directly from manufacturers. Section IV considers
whether it is socially desirable to permit contracting parties to allo-
cate risks despite inequality in the bargaining power of the parties and
possible ignorance of the buyer or seller with respect to the nature and
3. Id.
4. Id. at 14, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 613.
5. Id. at 21, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
6. Id. at 8, 465 N.Y.S.2d 610.
7. Id. at 25-27, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 620-21. The court held, however, that consequential
damages could be recovered if fraud were proved. Id. at 23-25, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 618-19.
8. See infra notes 96-118.
9. See infra notes 144-51.
10. Cayuga Harvester, 95 A.D.2d at 13, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 611.
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magnitude of the risks involved. Section V examines warranty and
tort claims in cases in which the buyer of the product does not deal
directly with the seller, but obtains the defective product from an
intermediary. Section VI discusses personal injury claims that emerge
in a commercial context and considers the extent to which they can be
accommodated within the general structure of risk allocation dis-
cussed in this Article. In Section VII, this Article concludes by pro-
posing that, in cases of commercial loss (not involving personal injury
or property damage to ordinary consumers), the law of product liabil-
ity should be confined to claims in contract..
II. THE UCC AND THE REGIME OF CONTRACT
A. Standards of Liability
Under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), an aggrieved
buyer may sue for breach of express or implied warranty. An express
warranty is any "affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of
the bargain."" Moreover, any "description of the goods which is
made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description."1 2 The statements may
appear in advertisements, labels, or brochures, as well as in the con-
tract itself, 3 and they may encompass representations made during
negotiations.' 4 However, "an affirmation merely of the value of the
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty."
' 15
There are two implied warranties. A "warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied ... if the seller is a merchant with
respect to goods of that kind."1 6 To be merchantable, goods must be
"fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."17 Fur-
11. U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a) (1987).
12. Id. § 2-313(1)(b). In addition, any "sample or model which is made part of the basis of
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to the
sample or model." Id. § 2-313(l)(c).
13. E.g., Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes,. Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983)
(advertisements); Community Tel. Serv., Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.
1978) (same), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus., Inc., 395
F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (printed circulars); Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,
152 Cal. App. 3d 951, 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984) (sales brochure).
14. The parol evidence rule, however, may exclude prior and contemporaneous
representations. See U.C.C. § 2-202. Absent such a bar, such representations can constitute
express warranties. See Transamerica Oil, 723 F.2d at 762.
15. U.C.C. § 2-313(2).
16. Id. § 2-314(1).
17. Id. § 2-314(2)(c). In addition, goods must be at least such as:
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ther, where the seller "has reason to know any particular purpose for
which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is
. . . an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such
purpose."18
In the event of breach of warranty, the buyer may reject the
goods.19 With respect to accepted goods, the buyer may be able to
revoke acceptance in some cases and seek a refund of the purchase
price.20 The more general measure of damages is the difference
"between the value of the goods accepted and the value they would
have had if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances
show proximate damages of a different amount.
21
In a proper case, the buyer may also recover incidental and con-
sequential damages.2 2 Incidental damages include "any commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
[obtaining substitute goods] and any other reasonable expense inci-
dent to the delay or other breach."'2 3 Consequential damages include:
"(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to
know and which could not reasonably be prevented ...; and (b)
injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of
warranty. " 2
4
The UCC provides comprehensive protection:
1. A breach of warranty may result in product failure so com-
plete as to render the product worthless, or the breach may cause an
accident that results in the destruction of the product. In either case,
the proper measure of damages is the cost of replacement ("the value
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
Id. § 2-314(2). Other implied warranties "may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade."
Id. § 2-314(3).
18. Id. § 2-315.
19. Id. § 2-601. The seller, however, has a limited opportunity to cure a deficiency. See
id. § 2-508.
20. Id. § 2-608.
21. Id. § 2-714(2).
22. Id. § 2-714(3).
23. Id. § 2-715(l).
24. Id. § 2-715(2).
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the goods would have had if they had been as warranted").25 If the
product can be rehabilitated after either a breakdown or accident, the
proper measure of damages is the cost of repair (a good proxy for the
diminution in value caused by the product's deficiency).26
2. Physical damage to other tangible property, such as damage
to work-in-progress or damage to adjacent equipment, can be recov-
ered as "injury to . . . property proximately resulting from [the]
breach of warranty." Recovery can be had without regard to whether
the damage is inflicted by product failure or by an accident triggered
by the product's deficiency.27
3. Lost profits and other economic losses can be recovered as
long as the seller had knowledge or reason to know of the "general or
particular requirements and needs" of the buyer. Again, recovery is
available whether these losses ensue from product failure or product
mishap.28
B. Contractual Limitations on Liability
Warranties may be excluded or modified, and remedies may be
limited, by agreement of the parties. As to express warranties,
"[w]ords or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty
and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but...
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construc-
tion is unreasonable. '29 In short, a contract cannot both create and
disclaim an express warranty.
With respect to implied warranties, an exclusion or limitation of
the warranty of merchantability "must mention merchantability and
in case of a writing must be conspicuous"; to exclude any implied
warranty of fitness, "the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicu-
ous."3 All implied warranties are excluded by "expressions like 'as
25. Id. § 2-714(2).
26. Id. § 2-714(2); 1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 504
(practitioners ed., 3d ed. 1988). The buyer should also recover for any impairment of value
remaining after repairs have been completed. Id.
27. U.C.C. § 715(2); see I J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at 524.
28. U.C.C. § 715(2); see, e.g., Central Bit Supply, Inc. v. Waldrop Drilling & Pump, Inc.,
102 Nev. 139, 717 P.2d 35 (1986) (purely economic loss may be recovered under breach of
warranty theory); see also 1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at 518-19. The recovery
of consequential damages is limited by foreseeability, although this limit has not proved to be a
significant impediment in any of the cases examined in this Article.
29. U.C.C. § 2-316(l).
30. Id. § 2-316(2). Further: "Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description on the face hereof.' " Id.
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is,' 'with all faults,' or other language which in common understand-
ing calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and
makes plain that there is no implied warranty. "31
On remedies, the UCC provides that damages for breach of war-
ranty "may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount
which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the incon-
venience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate rem-
edy."' 32 More generally:
[T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in sub-
stitution for those provided in [Article 2 of the UCC] and may
limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under [Article
2], as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and
repayment of the price or to repair and replacement of non-con-
forming goods or parts.3 3
There are, however, three limitations: (1) resort "to a remedy as pro-
vided is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive,
in which case it is the sole remedy"; 34 (2) "[w]here circumstances
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose,
remedy may be had as provided in [the UCC]"; 3 5 and (3)
"[c]onsequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the limi-
tation or exclusion is unconscionable." The limitation of consequent-
ial damages is prima facie unconscionable for injuries to persons in
the case of consumer goods, but not where the loss is commercial. 36
In addition to this specific reference to unconscionability, there is a
more general provision empowering the courts to invalidate any con-
tract or any clause of a contract if it was "unconscionable at the time
it was made."
37
Within this statutory framework, efforts to disclaim or modify
warranties, or to limit remedies for their breach, must comply with
these requirements:
1. Timeliness. The disclaimer or limitation of a warranty must
31. Id. § 2-316(3)(a). Moreover, "when the buyer before entering into the contract has
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the
circumstances to have revealed to him." Id. § 2-316(3)(b). Additionally, "an implied
warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or
usage of trade." Id. § 2-316(3)(c).
32. Id. § 2-718(1).
33. Id. § 2-719(l)(a).
34. Id. § 2-719(l)(b).
35. Id. § 2-719(2).
36. Id. § 2-719(3).
37. Id. § 2-302.
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be part of the contract; subsequent communication is ineffective. For
example, a notice that is attached to a product and delivered after the
contract has been made is ineffective.38
2. Buyer awareness. Even if a disclaimer or limitation is timely,
it is inoperative unless the buyer has been given proper notice of its
existence. The UCC requires that disclaimers of implied warranties
be "conspicuous," 3 9 but it imposes no similar requirement on limita-
tions of remedies.' The courts, however, have sometimes gone
beyond the terms of the UCC to protect unsophisticated buyers
against inadvertent surrender of their rights.4' By contrast, sophisti-
cated buyers have been held to a higher standard.42
38. Bowdoin v. Showell Growers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (collecting cases);
Horizons, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 551 F. Supp. 771 (D.S.D. 1982) (notice attached to product),
modified on other grounds, 714 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1983); Benco Plastics, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (notice in catalogue); Dessert Seed Co. v.
Drew Farmers Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970) (notice attached to
product); Klein v. Asgrow Seed Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966)
(subsequent communication; pre-UCC); Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct.
478, 276 A.2d 807 (1970) (notice in operator's manual), cert. denied, 160 Conn. 590, 274 A.2d
884 (1971); Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc. v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(notice attached to product); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Inc., 132 Ga. App. 435, 208
S.E.2d 321 (1974) (notice delivered after delivery of product); Album Graphics, Inc. v.
Beatrice Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980) (notices on package label and
invoice); C. Christopher & Son v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 215 Kan. 185, 523 P.2d 709
(1974) (notice on invoice), modified, 215 Kan. 510, 525 P.2d 626 (1974); Cambern v.
Hubbling, 307 Minn. 168, 238 N.W.2d 622 (1976) (notice on receipt); Whitaker v. Farmhand,
Inc., 173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977) (notice in operator's manual); Pfizer Genetics, Inc. v.
Williams Management Co., 204 Neb. 151, 281 N.W.2d 536 (1979) (notices on package label
and shipping invoice); Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849
(Okla. 1979) (notice on invoice); Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn.
App. 13, 457 S.W.2d 864 (1970) (alternative holding) (notice on label).
39. U.C.C. § 2-316; see Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Pa. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970); Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 276 A.2d 807 (1970), cert.
denied, 160 Conn. 590, 274 A.2d 884 (1971); Oldham's Farm Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633
S.W.2d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Laudisio v. Amoco Oil Co., 108 Misc. 2d 245, 437 N.Y.S.2d
502 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v. SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457
S.W.2d 864 (1970).
40. U.C.C. § 2-719; see Computerized Radiological Servs., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F.
Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), modified on other grounds, 786 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986).
41. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Frank's
Maintenance & Eng'g, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 I11. App. 3d 980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980);
Oldham's Fine Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Jutta's Inc. v.
Fireco Equip. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 301, 375 A.2d 687 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977);
Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., 58 A.D.2d 48, 396
N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977); Rottinghaus v. Howell, 35 Wash. App. 99, 666 P.2d 899 (1983).
42. See Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986); Delhomme
Indus., Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 669 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1982); Argo Welded Prods.,
Inc. v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, 528 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co.
v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977); cf. Billings v. Joseph Harris
Co., 27 N.C. App. 689, 220 S.E.2d 361 (1975) (A buyer was held to contractual limitations on
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3. The special status of express warranties. Express warranties
cannot be disclaimed, and modifications must be consistent with the
main purport of the warranty sought to be modified.43 This places a
burden on the seller to assure that particular affirmations are not con-
strued as express warranties. By appropriate language, express war-
ranties can be negated-that is, some statements never attain the
status of warranties-thereby obviating the need for disclaimer.'
4. Exclusivity of a limited remedy. The UCC requires that the
exclusivity of limited remedies be made explicit.45 Otherwise, a lim-
ited remedy will be construed as an optional additional remedy and
will not preclude other remedies available under the UCC.46
5. Failure of a limited remedy. If an exclusive or limited remedy
fails of its "essential purpose," other remedies become available.47
The two most common situations are: (1) instances in which the
exclusive remedy is the repair or replacement of defective products or
parts, and the seller fails to make timely replacement or repair;48 and
(2) instances in which the buyer's right to object to deficiencies is so
narrowly circumscribed as to preclude meaningful objections to latent
defects. 49  The first category is unremarkable; wholly apart from rem-
liability, despite a claim of illiteracy, because of the substantial size of the buyer's operations.),
aff'd, 290 N.C. 502, 226 S.E.2d 321 (1976).
43. U.C.C. § 2-316(1); see, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., Div. of
ITT Grinnell Corp., 777 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1985) (A disclaimer was held ineffective when it
conflicted with an express warranty.); Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data
Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1983) (Specific warranty language prevails over a general
disclaimer where the two cannot be reasonably reconciled.).
44. An integration clause may serve to exclude, under the parol evidence rule, prior
representations that otherwise would have qualified as express warranties. See Arkwright-
Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 844 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1988); Jaskey
Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Bruffey Contracting
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 522 F. Supp. 769 (D. Md. 1981), aff'd per curiam, 681 F.2d 812 (4th
Cir. 1982); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ct. App.
1980). In addition, the structure of a contract may indicate that certain representations were
not intended as warranties. See U.S. Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 509 F.2d 1043
(6th Cir. 1975); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter., 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 349 N.E.2d
627 (1976).
45. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b).
46. Id. § 2-317; see, e.g., Council Bros. v. Ray Burner Co., 473 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1973);
Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 261, 485 S.W.2d 183 (1972); District Concrete Co. v. Bernstein
Concrete Corp., 418 A.2d 1030 (D.C. 1980).
47. U.C.C. § 2-719(2).
48. E.g., Bosway Tube & Steel Corp. v. McKay Mach. Co., 65 Mich. App. 426, 237
N.W.2d 488 (1975); Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
49. See Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Neville
Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), vacated on other
grounds, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Leprino v. Intermountain
Brick Co., 759 P.2d 835 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc.,
121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (1981); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23
[Vol. 44:731
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edy limitations, the seller has breached its duty to repair or replace.
The second category is more troublesome. An explicit limitation on
the buyer's right to object may involve a deliberate allocation of risk
that should not be disturbed under the guise of preserving remedial
rights.
Limited remedies-such as a restriction to repair or replace-are
usually accompanied by an exclusion of consequential damages. If
the seller does not make timely repairs or replacements, the exclusion
of consequential damages may also be challenged. Under such cir-
cumstances, the courts are inclined to allow consequential damages
when necessary to assure that the buyer receives the benefit of its bar-
gain.5" In other cases, however, the exclusion of consequential dam-
N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968); Construction Assoc. v. Fargo Water
Equip. Co., 444 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1989) (alternative holding); Trinkle v. Schumacher Co.,
100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980); cf. Comind, Companhia de Seguros v.
Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Corp., 116 F.R.D. 397 (D. Conn. 1987)
(reasonableness of time limit raised issue of fact); Q. Vandenberg & Sons, N.V. v. Siter, 204 Pa.
Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964) (reasonableness of time limit submitted to jury). These
decisions frequently rely on Section 1-204 of the Uniform Commercial Code, prohibiting
manifestly unreasonable time limits, and Section 2-302, prohibiting unconscionable contract
provisions. See Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of
UCC Section 2-719(2), 65 CALIF. L. REV. 28 (1977).
By contrast, relatively short time limits on express warranties have been sustained in a
number of cases. See Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980) (90
days); Polygram, S.A. v. 32-03 Enters., 697 F. Supp. 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Office
Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (same); Aplications Inc.
v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 501 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (same), aff'dper curiam, 672 F.2d
1076 (2d Cir. 1982); Badger Bearing Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Wis.
1977) (same), aff'd per curiam, 588 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1978); cf. Landsman Packing Co. v.
Continental Can Co., 864 F.2d 721 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (submitting reasonableness of 30-day limit
to jury); Hart Eng'g Co. v. FMC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D.R.I. 1984) (sustaining a one-
year warranty limit).
50. Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985) (South Carolina law);
RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985) (California law); R.W.
Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985) (Missouri law); Fiorito
Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984) (Washington law); Rudd Constr.
Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974 (6th Cir. 1984) (Kentucky law); Matco Mach. &
Tool Co. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 727 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1984) (Ohio law); Soo Line R.R.
v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977) (Minnesota law); Custom Automated Mach.
Co. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (Illinois law); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v.
Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Michigan law); Koehring Co.
v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (Michigan law) (emphasis on lack of
reasonable effort); Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973) (Delaware
law); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. 11. 1970)
(Pennsylvania law) (emphasis on lack of reasonable effort); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird,
432 So. 2d 1259 (Ala. 1983); Kalil Bottling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d
1055 (Ct. App. 1980); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814
(1984); Earl M. Jorgenson Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 540 P.2d 978 (1975); Clark
v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v.
Aaron Friedman, Inc., 96 Ill. App. 3d 376, 421 N.E.2d 336 (1981); Adams v. J.I. Case Co.,
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ages is viewed as severable from the failed remedy; the buyer may
recover only direct damages (diminution in value or cost of repair or
replacement), but not consequential damages (such as lost profits).5
6. Preservation of a minimum remedy. In cases of unequal bar-
gaining power, a court may strike limitations on remedies in order to
preserve a minimum remedy for the buyer. For example, deficiencies
in seeds, herbicides, and pesticides may lead to extensive crop losses
by farmer-purchasers. In these circumstances, some courts have
125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1978) (reliance on state's Consumer Protection Act); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans,
406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981) (reliance on special state amendments to UCC); Oldham's Farm
Sausage Co. v. Salco, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 177 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); John Deere Co. v. Hand, 211
Neb. 549, 319 N.W.2d 434 (1982); cf Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584,
510 S.W.2d 555 (1974) (leaving issue open for further development on remand); Hydraform
Prods. Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 127 N.H. 187, 498 A.2d 339 (1985)
(replacement remedy unavailable where breach was delay in delivery; consequential damages
allowed).
51. Kaplan v. RCA Corp., 783 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1986) (New Jersey law); Chatlos Sys. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (New Jersey law), opinion on
damages, 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982); S.M. Wilson & Co. v.
Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) (California law); AES Technology Sys. v.
Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir. 1978) (California and Illinois law); Marr Enters. v.
Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977) (Washington law); Werner & Pfleiderer
Corp. v. Gary Chem. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 1988) (New Jersey law); Harper Tax
Servs., Inc. v. Quick Tax, Ltd., 686 F. Supp. 109 (D. Md. 1988) (Maryland law); Cole Energy
Dev. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 678 F. Supp. 208 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (Illinois law); Computerized
Radiological Servs., Inc. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (California law),
modified on other grounds, 786 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1986); In re Feder Litho-Graphic Servs., Inc.,
40 Bankr. 486 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (Illinois law); Frantz Lithographic Serv., Inc. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 485 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (Pennsylvania law); Garden
State Food Distribs., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., Sperry Univac Div., 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J.
1981) (New Jersey law); Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis.
1979) (Michigan law); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D. Me.
1977) (Pennsylvania law); American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Pennsylvania and New York law); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974) (Pennsylvania law), rev'd on
unspecified grounds, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975); County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding &
Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Ohio law), aff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, No. 84-CA-48-MR (Ky.
Apr. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Ky file); Cox Motor Co. v. Castle, 402 S.W.2d 429 (Ky.
1966); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 107 N.J. 584, 527 A.2d 429 (1987);
Cayuga Harvester v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983); Stutts v.
Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980); Johnson v. John Deere Co., 306
N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981); Envirotech Corp. v. Halco Eng'g, Inc., 234 Va. 583, 364 S.E.2d 215
(1988); cf Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Washington law) (issue remanded for hearing on the conscionability of exclusion of
consequential damages); Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage
Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983) (Washington law) (same disposition).
For a general discussion, see Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential
Purpose to an Exclusion of Consequential Damages: An Objective Approach, 25 DuQ. L. REV.
551 (1987).
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allowed farmers to recover for such losses despite limitations on reme-
dies which purported to restrict the buyers to the recovery of the
purchase price.52 Other courts, however, have sustained such limita-
tions as permissible allocations of risk.5 3
In most other cases involving commercial loss, courts have sus-
tained both limited remedies and complete disclaimers. Nonetheless,
if the buyer is relatively unsophisticated and the seller is the stronger
party, some courts intervene to protect the buyer-invoking the doc-
trine of unconscionability 4
52. Herrick v. Monsanto Co., 874 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1989) (South Dakota law) (defective
herbicide); Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1985) (Michigan law)
(defective seed); Agricultural Servs. Ass'n v. Ferry-Morse Seed Co., 551 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir.
1977) (California law) (mislabeled seed); Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 20
(M.D. Ala. 1975) (Alabama law) (defective inoculant); Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers
Supply, Inc., 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970) (mislabeled seed); Klein v. Asgrow Seed
Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 87, 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1966) (deliberately mislabeled seeds; pre-UCC
case); Corneli Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) (mislabeled seed);
Mallory v. Conida Warehouses, Inc., 134 Mich. App. 28, 350 N.W.2d 825 (1984) (defective
seed); Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 33 A.D.2d 17, 304 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1969) (defective seed);
Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971) (mislabeled seed); Schmaltz
v. Nissan, 431 N.W.2d 657 (S.D. 1988) (defective seed); Hanson v. Funk Seeds Int'l, 373
N.W.2d 30 (S.D. 1985) (defective seed); Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.D.
1982) (defective pesticide); Nakanishi v. Foster, 64 Wash. 2d 647, 393 P.2d 635 (1964)
(mislabeled seed). The decision in Hanson was "abrogated" by statute. See S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-302 note (1988).
53. Lindemann v. Eli Lilly & Co., 816 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1987) (Texas law) (defective
herbicide); Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 696 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1983) (South Carolina law)
(defective herbicide); Feeders, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. Civ. 4-77-306 (D. Minn. May 15,
1981) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (defective herbicide); Bickett v. W.R. Grace & Co., 12
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 629 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (Kentucky law) (defective seed); Nunes
Turfgrass, Inc. v. Vaughan-Jacklin Seed Co., 200 Cal. App. 3d 1518, 246 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct.
App. 1988) (defective seed); Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156, 259 P. 108 (1927)
(defective seed; pre-UCC case); Monsanto Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (defective herbicide); California Chem. Co. v. Lovett, 204 So. 2d 633 (La.
Ct. App. 1967) (defective pesticide); Von Zonneveld Bros. & Philippo v. Cary, 86 So. 2d 252
(La. Ct. App. 1956) (defective seed); Kleven v. Geigy Agric. Chems., 303 Minn. 320, 227
N.W.2d 566 (1975) (defective herbicide); Billings v. Joseph Harris Co., 27 N.C. App. 689, 220
S.E.2d 361 (1975) (defective seed); Asgrow Seed Co. v. Gulick, 420 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Ct. App.
1967) (mislabeled seed).
54. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1977); Vlases
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F.
Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Steele v. J.I. Case Co., 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902 (1966) (pre-
UCC case); Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc., 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (1981);
Jutta's Inc. v. Fireco Equip. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 301, 375 A.2d 687 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1977); Evans v. Graham Ford, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 435, 442 N.E.2d 777 (1981); Construction
Assocs. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 444 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1989) (alternative holding); cf.
Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (remanded for
hearing on issue of disparate bargaining power), cert. denied, 289 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1974);
Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1974) (remanded for hearing on issue of choice as to limitation of liability); Laudisio v. Amoco
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
For example, in A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp.," A & M, an
agricultural company, purchased a tomato processing machine from
FMC.5 6 The contract of sale contained a disclaimer of warranties and
an exclusion of consequential damages. 7 When the machine failed to
function properly, A & M lost its crop. 8 In an action by A & M to
recover the value of its lost crop, the court held that both the dis-
claimer and the exclusion were inoperative. 9 The court found the
provisions to be procedurally unconscionable because the parties were
of disparate size and experience; the disclaimer and exclusion were on
the reverse side of a printed form and were not called to the buyer's
attention; and the terms were not subject to negotiation.' The court
also found the provisions to be substantively unconscionable, ruling
that it was unreasonable to assume that "a buyer would purchase a
standardized mass-produced product from an industry seller without
any enforceable performance standards," and that the seller was in a
better position to bear the risks of nonperformance.6" An inexperi-
enced buyer had relied on the expertise of FMC, and the court held
FMC accountable for the product's failure.6 2
In contrast, a limitation of liability provision was found not to be
unconscionable in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Eastman Kodak
Co. 6 3 In Aetna, the insurer of National Geographic sought damages
for film improperly processed by Kodak."4 The processing was inci-
dental to sale of the film, and the contract of sale provided that Kodak
would replace damaged film but would not be liable for other dam-
ages.65 The court observed that damage to film could cause large sen-
timental loss (a parent's picture of a child) or substantial commercial
loss (pictures taken in a space flight).66 The court emphasized:
There does not appear any way that the company can fairly
price its services unless it does limit its liability in some way,
because the efforts that it otherwise [would take] in order to pro-
Oil Co., 108 Misc. 2d 245, 437 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (remanded for hearing on issue of
duress).
55. 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982).
56. Id. at 478-79, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 480, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
59. Id. at 493, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 127.
60. Id. at 490-91, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 124-25.
61. Id. at 491-92, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
62. Id. at 492, 186 Cal. Rptr. 125-26.
63. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 53 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1972).
64. Id. at 54.
65. Id. at 54-55.
66. Id. at 55.
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tect against those anticipations of what the risks might be, will
price the product right out of the market....
If required to answer every conceivable lawsuit which might
be filed as a result of defects [in the film or its processing], the cost
to the consumer of the film would be many times as much as it
presently is .... 67
The limitation on liability was sustained as not unconscionable.68
A & M Produce and Aetna reflect the general approach of the
courts to unconscionability issues in commercial cases. When a limi-
tation on liability has not been adequately disclosed by a seller, partic-
ularly to an unsophisticated or uninformed buyer, the courts are
likely to strike down such a limitation as unconscionable. The courts,
as in A & M Produce, may also comment on the disparate size and
bargaining position of the parties and the absence of negotiation over
the terms of the limitation. By contrast, if the buyer is adequately
informed of the limitation, the provision is likely to be sustained-
without regard to the relative bargaining positions of the parties or
the presence or absence of negotiations. In Aetna, for example, the
provision was a standardized term imposed by the dominant firm in
the photography industry.
C. Additional Limitations on Liability
There are four additional limitations on the liability of a seller
under the Uniform Commercial Code:
1. Notice. On discovery of a breach of warranty, the buyer
"must within a reasonable time ... notify the seller of breach or be
67. Id. at 56.
68. Id. at 57; accord Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa.
1978); Carr v. Hoosier Photo Supplies, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1982); D.O.V. Graphics,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Ohio Misc. 37, 347 N.E.2d 561 (Ct. C.P. 1976). But cf Mieske
v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 593 P.2d 1308 (1979) (A limitation of liability was held to
be insufficiently conspicuous in a consumer transaction.).
For discussions of the question of limiting damages to a level considered to be unduly low,
see Wyatt Indus., Inc. v. Publicker Indus., Inc., 420 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1969) (sustaining limit);
Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969) (sustaining limit);
Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Corp., 116
F.R.D. 397 (D. Conn. 1987) (limit raised a triable issue); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (invalidating limit), vacated on other grounds, 422
F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-
Erie Co., 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584 (1986) (invalidating limit).
For a discussion of unconscionability in the context of commercial warranties, see Mallor,
Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065 (1986); Phillips,
Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199
(1985); Note, Unconscionability Redefined. California Imposes New Duties on Commercial
Parties Using Form Contracts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 161 (1983).
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barred from any remedy."'69 This should pose no problem for com-
mercial parties represented by competent counsel, but it might pose
problems for an unwary buyer.
2. Privity. A buyer may not be able to recover for breach of
warranty if it is not "in privity" with the seller 7° -that is, if the
purchase was not made directly by the buyer from the seller, but was
made through intermediaries. States have varied the provisions of the
UCC in this respect,7' and judicial interpretations have also
diverged.72 The ability of buyers to sue remote manufacturers is an
important part of devising a solution to the problem of accountability
for commercial loss. This issue is addressed in a subsequent section.73
3. Foreseeability. The UCC provides that a seller is not responsi-
ble for losses other than those arising from physical injury to person
or property, unless the losses result from the buyer's "general or par-
ticular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of con-
tracting had reason to know."' 74 This limitation, however, has not
been of decisional significance in any of the many litigated cases
examined in the preparation of this Article. As long as a machine or
other product is used for its intended purpose, a seller will be held
responsible for losses expected to follow from product failure: dam-
age to work-in-progress, damage to associated equipment, and disrup-
tion of the buyer's business resulting in lost profits. 75  It is not
necessary to show that the manufacturer anticipated the particular
losses or their magnitude, or that it knew precisely how each of its
prodticts would be used by multifarious buyers.76
4. Statute of limitations. The UCC provides that an action for
breach of warranty must generally be commenced within four years of
the tender of delivery of the goods, "regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. '77 The parties may shorten
the statutory period to not less than one year, but they may not
69. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) (1987).
70. See infra Section V.
71. The UCC has three variations of Section 2-318, entitled "Third Party Beneficiaries of
Warranties Express or Implied." U.C.C. § 2-318. There are further variations in individual
states. See I J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at 531-41.
72. See infra notes 208-15.
73. See infra Section V.
74. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a).
75. See supra notes 27-28.
76. See R. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 97-101 (3d ed. 1987)
(With rare exceptions, courts either ignore foreseeability or treat the issue perfunctorily in
breach of warranty cases that seek lost profits.); I J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at
518.
77. U.C.C. § 2-725(1), (2).
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extend it.7 If, however, "a warranty extends to future performance
of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such
performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered." 79
The statute of limitations is a device for allocation of risks. If the
sales transaction is silent on the issue, buyers are barred unless they
discover and act on defects within four years of tender of delivery.
Thus, buyers bear the risk of defects discovered after the expiration of
the four-year period. But buyers can bargain for a longer period (by
having the warranty extend to future performance), and sellers can
bargain for a shorter period (not less than one year). Still, the UCC's
statute of limitations poses a formidable obstacle to recovery when
latent defects manifest themselves years after the delivery of a defec-
tive product.8 0
III. EXCURSIONS IN TORT LAW
Despite the extensive treatment of sales transactions in the Uni-
form Commercial Code, commercial buyers frequently bring actions
in tort. These litigation decisions are not adventitious; buyers seek to
circumvent the requirements and limitations of the UCC. In an
action in tort, neither privity nor notice to the manufacturer is
required. The requirement of foreseeability may also be relaxed
(although this does not seem to have been a factor in any of the
reported cases). The statute of limitations will run from the time of
loss rather than from the time of delivery (and this may be of great
significance in at least some cases involving latent defects). Most
importantly for present purposes, warranty disclaimers and limita-
tions on remedy may be disregarded by courts in tort cases; courts are
more hostile to tort disclaimers than to warranty disclaimers.
Efforts to recover commercial losses by suing in tort have
78. Id. § 2-725(1).
79. Id. § 2-725(2).
80. For several notorious examples of cases involving the sale of asbestos products, see
infra note 105. The statute of limitations is nonetheless subject to "tolling" under state law,
see U.C.C. § 2-725(3), and this may provide a solution. See Werber v. Mercedes-Benz of N.
Am., Inc., 199 Cal. Rptr. 765 (Ct. App. 1984) (tolling the statute of limitations until the
discovery of a latent defect in a consumer case). Werber is not definitive on this issue; the case
was decertified by the California Supreme Court, precluding its citation as precedent in the
California courts. See note at 152 Cal. App. 3d 1039 (1984).
Whether the UCC statute of limitations should be modified, to permit recovery for latent
defects discovered long after the sale, is a legitimate issue-particularly where, as in the
asbestos cases, the sellers have engaged in a pattern of concealment. The resolution of that
issue, however, does not depend on transforming warranty claims into tort claims.
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spawned an expansive body of litigation."1 Most of the cases have
involved claims in negligence and strict product liability, but claims
premised on misrepresentation have also been asserted.
A. Negligence and Strict Liability
The starting point is the landmark California case of Seely v.
White Motor Co. 82 In Seely, the purchaser of a truck found that it
bounced violently, an action known as "galloping. '83  Despite
repeated efforts, the seller was unable to correct the deficiency. Seely
sued for the purchase price of the truck and for the profits that he lost
because he was unable to make normal use of the truck. 4 The Cali-
fornia court allowed recovery on the ground that the manufacturer
had breached an express warranty.85 The court refused, however, to
81. See Bland & Wattson, Property Damage Caused by Defective Products: What Losses
Are Recoverable?, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (1983); Franklin, When Worlds Collide.:
Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966);
Rabin & Grossman, Defective Products or Realty Causing Economic Loss.- Toward a Unified
Theory of Recovery, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 5 (1980); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel
Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19
RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law.- The
Examples of J'Aire and Products Liability, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 37 (1986); Speidel, Products
Liability, Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973); Speidel, Warranty
Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once More Into the Void, 67 B.U.L.
REV. 9 (1987) [hereinafter Speidel, Warranty Theory]; Towers & Gordon, Circumvention of
Article 2: Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 291 (1987); Wade, Tort
Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U. CC., 48 Mo. L. REV. 1
(1983); Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917
(1966); Note, Privity Revisited: Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for a Defective Product's
Self-Inflicted Damage, 84 MICH. L. REV. 517 (1985); Note, Recovery for Damage to the
Defective Product Itself An Analysis of Recent Product Liability Legislation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J.
533 (1987); see also M. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 4-2 to 4-3, 27-1 to 27-
44 (1987).
The problem of economic loss in products liability cases should be distinguished from
cases involving "pure economic loss," such as where an oil spill adversely affects persons with
interests in a waterway, Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985), 'cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986), or where a defective bridge impedes traffic to
dependent merchants, Nebraska Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345
N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984). For discussions of these issues, see W. LANDES AND R. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 251-55 (1987); S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 135-40 (1987); Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982); Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages.- .The
Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1986); Rabin, Tort Recovery
for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss. A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985);
Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, II J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982). See also
THE LAW OF TORT: POLICIES AND TRENDS IN LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND
ECONOMIC LOSS (M. Furmston ed. 1986).
82. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
83. Id. at 12, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal, Rptr. at 19.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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allow recovery on a theory of strict product liability: 6
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery
for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss
[turns on] the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must
undertake in distributing his products. He can appropriately be
held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his
goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions
that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the
level of performance of his products in the consumer's business
unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the con-
sumer's demands .... Even in actions for negligence, a manufac-
turer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there
is no recovery for economic loss alone.8 7
The Seely court observed that the basis of strict product liability
was the avoidance of "overwhelming misfortune" to injured persons,
losses that can be "insured by the manufacturer and distributed
among the public as a cost of doing business."88 This rationale of
strict product liability "in no way justifies requiring the consuming
public to pay more for their products so that a manufacturer can
insure against the possibility that some of his products will not meet
the business needs of some of his customers."' 9
In another aspect of the case, Seely sought recovery for damage
sustained by the truck when it overturned in an accident. 90 The claim
was denied because "galloping" was not shown to have caused the
accident.9 The court nonetheless agreed that "the doctrine of strict
liability in tort should be extended to govern physical injury to plain-
tiff's property." 92 The totality of the court's reasoning was that
"[p]hysical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that there
is no reason for distinguishing them." 93
In general, the position taken by the California court in Seely has
been followed in subsequent decisions in other states. If a product
fails to function properly, the buyer usually incurs expenses in repair-
ing or replacing the product. In addition, the buyer's business may be
disrupted, resulting in lost profits. Such "economic losses" generally
cannot be recovered in tort actions alleging negligence or strict prod-
86. Id. at 13-14, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
87. Id. at 18, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
88. Id. at 18-19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
89. Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
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uct liability.94 If, however, the defect in the product causes physical
injury to property, tort remedies are available. 95 This distinction is
easy to apply in some cases, but it poses severe difficulties in others.
There is no question that recovery may be had, in strict liability
or in negligence, if a defective product poses a hazard to other prop-
erty of the buyer and inflicts damage on that property. For example,
in Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc. ,96 the plaintiffs brought an action in
strict liability when a gas heater manufactured by the defendant mal-
functiohed and started a fire that destroyed the plaintiffs' premises.97
The court awarded damages for the property loss, for the cost of
cleanup and repair, and for lost profits. 98 The court observed:
We are not here dealing with the typical "loss of bargain"
issue. There is no claim that loss of profits were caused by the
defective heater inadequately heating the building or that the plain-
tiffs incurred damages from loss of use of the heater.... Here the
defective heater burned plaintiffs' building and disrupted their
business for eight months. Loss of profits by reason of the tortious
destruction of the plaintiffs' business was a foreseeable damage
ordinarily cognizable in tort liability .... 9'
Recovery has been allowed in other cases in which property of
the buyer (other than the purchased product) was damaged by defects
that caused fires t°° or explosions;' contributed to the crash of air-
94. See infra note 119.
95. See infra notes 96-111.
96. 490 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 1017.
98. Id. at 1022.
99. Id.
100. Nicor Supply Ships v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1989) (action in
tort, not further explained); Gates Rubber Co. v. Irathane Sys., 710 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1983)
(negligence and strict liability); Eastern Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations, Inc., 658
F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (negligence and strict liability); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
General Elec. Co., 376 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Va. 1974) (negligence); Monsanto Co. v. Alden
Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (negligence and strict liability);
Potsdam Welding & Mach. Co. v. Neptune Microfloc, Inc., 57 A.D.2d 993, 394 N.Y.S.2d 744
(1977) (strict liability); All-O-Matic Indus. v. Southern Specialty Paper Co., 49 A.D.2d 935,
374 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1975) (strict liability); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572
S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978) (strict liability); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance & TV Co., 9 Wash.
App. 797, 515 P.2d 540 (strict liability), modified, 10 Wash. App. 243, 518 P.2d 202 (1973);
Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (strict liability).
101. Boone Valley Coop Processing Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606
(N.D. Iowa 1974) (allowing lost profits in negligence and strict liability case); Dealers Transp.
Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965) (negligence and strict liability). Contra
Cline v. Prowler Indus., 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980) (holding that the UCC preempts strict
liability actions in sales transactions).
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craft' O2 or the collapse of industrial equipment; °3 destroyed or con-
taminated agricultural products; ° 4 or damaged or contaminated
buildings. 10 5  Some courts have gone further, permitting recovery
when the defective product rendered a building or work environment
unsafe, even though no personal injury or property damage had
occurred. 06 Others have allowed recovery when the property 'dam-
102. James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (strict liability); Sterner
Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1974) (negligence and strict
liability). In each of these cases, the defective product was a component of the aircraft, not the
aircraft itself.
103. ICI Austl. Ltd. v. Elliott Overseas Co., 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982) (negligence
and strict liability); Northern States Power Co. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp.
108 (D. Minn. 1982) (negligence and strict liability); Fordyce Concrete, Inc. v. Mack Trucks,
Inc., 535 F. Supp. 118 (D. Kan. 1982) (strict liability); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 120 Cal. App. 3d 842, 175 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1981) (negligence and strict
liability); Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225, 235 S.E.2d 664 (1977)
(negligence and strict liability).
104. Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (strict liability); Van
Wyk v. Norden Laboratories, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 81 (Iowa 1984) (strict liability); Chandler v.
Anchor Serum Co., 198 Kan. 571, 426 P.2d 82 (1967) (strict liability); Streich v. Hilton-Davis,
Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 214 Mont. 44, 692 P.2d 440 (1984) (negligence and strict liability);
O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 410 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (strict
liability), aff'd per curiam, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967); Tony Spychalla Farms v. Hopkins
Agric. Chem. Co., 151 Wis. 2d 431, 444 N.W.2d 743 (1989) (strict liability); cf. Blommer
Chocolate Co. v. Bongards Creameries, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (sustaining
negligence claim where contaminated ingredient led to contamination of chocolates and
chocolate processing facilities); Starks Feed Co. v. Consolidated Badger Co., 592 F. Supp. 1255
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (disallowing claim for feed contaminated by defective ingredient, but
sustaining claim for injuries to livestock consuming contaminated feed). But cf. Brown v.
Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974) (rejecting strict liability claim for
damage to chickens and eggs caused by defective feed).
105. City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987) (negligence;
asbestos products); Adams-Arapahoe School Dist. No. 28J v. Celotex Corp., 637 F. Supp.
1207 (D. Colo. 1986) (negligence and strict liability; asbestos products); City of Manchester v.
National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646 (D.R.I. 1986) (negligence and strict liability; asbestos
products); Town of Hooksett School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126 (D.N.H.
1984) (negligence and strict liability; asbestos products); Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ.
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982) (strict liability; asbestos products);
Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1983) (negligence and strict liability; non-
asbestos insulation); Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580 (1989)
(negligence and strict liability; asbestos products); School Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 750
S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (strict liability; asbestos products); cf. U.S. Home Corp. v.
George W. Kennedy Constr. Co., 565 F. Supp. 67 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (strict liability; defective
sewer pipe damaged other sections of sewer system); Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504,
471 S.W.2d 778 (1971) (negligence; defective floor coating created an offensive odor).
106. Consumers Power Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 780 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1986)
(negligence and strict liability; dangerous equipment); Corfab, Inc. v. Modine Mfg. Co., 641 F.
Supp. 448 (N.D. 11. 1986) (negligence and strict liability; dangerous equipment); Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank v. Dow Chem. Co., 605 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (strict liability; dangerous
building); Agristor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Or. 1985) (strict liability;
dangerous equipment); Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine Inc., 694 P.2d 150 (Alaska
1984) (strict liability; dangerous equipment); United Air Lines, Inc. v. CEI Indus., 148 Il1.
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age was to work-in-progress or was otherwise relatively minor in
scope. 11 7 The endangerment cases, and those basing tort liability on
trivial and incidental impacts on physical property, have made the
distinction between property damage and economic loss indistinct and
elusive. At times, the inquiry takes on a metaphysical quality-as in
the finding of one court that a malfunctioning mechanical planter had
inflicted property damage on a crop that had never been planted.1
0 8
When, as a result of a defect, the purchased product alone is
App. 3d 332, 499 N.E.2d 558 (1986) (negligence; dangerous building); Trustees of Columbia
Univ. v. Exposaic Indus., Inc., 122 A.D.2d 747, 505 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1986) (negligence and
strict liability; dangerous building). The "building contamination" cases, supra note 105, also
cite safety hazards. Other decisions, however, find no more than "economic loss" when a
hazardous condition has not resulted in personal injury or physical property damage. See
County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 728 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1984) (negligence and
strict liability); Bright v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 463 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1972)
(negligence and strict liability); Sioux City Community School Dist. v. International Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (strict liability); Trans World Airlines v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (negligence).
107. Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 665 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1982) (strict liability; damage to
crop being harvested); LeSueur Creamery, Inc. v. Haskon, Inc., 660 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1981)
(negligence; damage to cheese being processed), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982); Abco
Metals Corp. v. J.W. Imports Co., 560 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (strict liability and
negligence; damage to wire being processed), aff'd sub nom. Abco Metals Corp. v. Equico
Lessors, Inc., 721 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1983); Pisano v. American Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d 194,
194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983) (negligence; damage to wooden cabinets being processed; recovery in
strict liability for commercial losses rejected). By contrast, many courts refuse to impose tort
liability on the basis of minor property damage. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania
Eng'g Corp., 785 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1986) (negligence and strict liability; damage to related
equipment); 2000 Watermark Ass'n v. Celotex Corp., 784 F.2d 1183 (4th Cir. 1986)
(negligence; damage to adjacent materials); Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of
Am., 782 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1986) (negligence; damage to adjacent materials and to interior of
building); Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984) (negligence; damage
to adjacent materials); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1983)
(strict liability; damage to ice cream being processed); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (negligence and strict liability; damage to
interior of building); Florida Power & Light Co. v. McGraw Edison Co., 696 F. Supp. 617
(S.D. Fla. 1988) (negligence and strict liability; damage to adjacent materials), aff'd, 875 F.2d
873 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Roxalana Hills, Ltd. v. Masonite Corp., 627 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D. W. Va.
1986) (negligence and strict liability; damage to adjacent materials), aff'dper curiam, 813 F.2d
1228 (4th Cir. 1987); Agristor Leasing v. Guggisberg, 617 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1985)
(negligence and strict liability; damage to contents of feed storage system); Dixie-Portland
Flour Mills, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 613 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (negligence and strict
liability; damage to other ingredients and packaging); National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp.,
505 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (negligence; damage to contents of cans); Nelson v. Todd's
Ltd., 426 N.W.2d 120 (Iowa 1988) (strict liability; damage to food being processed);
Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816
(Minn. 1984) (negligence and strict liability; damage to adjacent materials).
108. Manning v. International Harvester Co., 381 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
Another source of uncertainty is the distinction between sales of products and the provision of
services. Some courts refuse to apply the "economic loss" doctrine to service contracts. See,
e.g., Unger v. Bryant Equip. Sales & Servs. Co., 255 Ga. 53, 335 S.E.2d 109 (1985) (permitting
a tort action alleging negligent installation and servicing of leased milking equipment).
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damaged or destroyed in an accident-like occurrence, many courts
allow recovery in negligence and strict liability. 9 There is, however,
a substantial minority view,110 recently reinforced by the United
States Supreme Court in an admiralty decision. In East River Steam-
ship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., ' Seatrain and affiliated
109. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Lakeshore, Inc., 753 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1985) (New Mexico
law) (negligence, but recovery not permitted in strict liability); James v. Bell Helicopter Co.,
715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (Illinois law) (strict liability); Comind, Companhia de Seguros v.
Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United Technologies Corp., 116 F.R.D. 397 (D. Conn. 1987)
(admiralty and Connecticut law) (negligence and strict liability); Corporate Air Fleet v. Gates
Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (Tennessee law) (negligence and strict
liability); Fordyce Concrete, Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 118 (D. Kan. 1982)
(Kansas law) (strict liability); C & S Fuel, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 524 F. Supp. 949 (E.D.
Ky. 1981) (Kentucky law) (negligence and strict liability); Hardly Able Coal Co. v.
International Harvester Co., 494 F. Supp. 249 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Kentucky law) (strict liability);
Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977) (strict liability; consumer product); Salt
River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 143 Ariz. 368,
694 P.2d 198 (1984) (strict liability); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306
S.E.2d 253 (1983) (negligence); Long Mfg., N.C., Inc. v. Grady Tractor Co., 140 Ga. App.
320, 231 S.E.2d 105 (1976) (negligence); Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 466
N.E.2d 195 (1984) (negligence and strict liability); John R. Dudley Constr. Inc. v. Drott Mfg.
Co., 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979) (strict liability); Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 281
Or. 587, 575 P.2d 1383 (1978) (strict liability); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods.,
572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978) (strict liability); Capitol Fuels, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., 382
S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1989) (strict liability); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297
S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1982) (strict liability). Dicta in other cases have also approved of recovery
under these circumstances. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 19, 403 P.2d 145, 152,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24 (1965); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 81-86, 435
N.E.2d 443, 448-50 (1982); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 789-
90, 332 N.W.2d 39, 43 (1983). A Connecticut statute further supports this position, allowing
recovery in negligence or strict liability for damage to the product sold. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-572m(d) (Supp. 1988).
110. Laurens Elec. Corp. Inc. v. Altec Indus., 889 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1989) (South
Carolina law) (strict liability); Aloe Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 816 F.2d 110 (3d Cir.)
(Pennsylvania law) (negligence) (disapproving Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennyslvania law) (damage to product itself
actionable in strict liability), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 853 (1987)); Florida Power & Light Co. v.
McGraw Edison Co., 696 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (Florida law) (negligence and strict
liability), aff'd, 875 F.2d 873 (1 1th Cir. 1989); Cargill, Inc. v. Products Eng'g Co., 627 F.
Supp. 1492 (D. Minn. 1986) (Minnesota law) (negligence and strict liability); Lloyd Wood
Coal Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 543 So. 2d 671 (Ala. 1989) (negligence and strict liability);
Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987) (negligence); S.J.
Groves & Sons v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985) (negligence
and strict liability); Thofson v. Redex Indus., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(negligence and strict liability); Nelson v. International Harvester Corp., 394 N.W.2d 578
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (negligence and strict liability); Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Lindsay Bros., 364
N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (negligence), aff'd, 381 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. 1986); Sharp
Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986) (strict
liability); Utah Int'l v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M. 539, 775 P.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1989)
(negligence and strict liability); REM Coal Co. v. Clark. Equip. Co., 563 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (negligence and strict liability); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978) (strict liability).
111. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
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companies contracted with Delaval for the construction and installa-
tion of turbines in vessels owned by Seatrain. "2 The turbines in three
ships were defective, and a fourth turbine was improperly installed., 3
Plaintiffs sued in strict liability and negligence for the cost of repairing
the turbines and for profits lost while the ships were inoperable. 1 4
The Supreme Court held that neither theory was available in the
absence of personal injury or damage to other property." 5 The Court
adopted the reasoning of Seely, but extended that reasoning to apply
to damage to the defective product:
We realize that the damage [to the defective product] may be quali-
tative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal break-
age. Or it may be calamitous. But either way, since by definition
no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely
economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs
through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to
repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the fail-
ure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain-tradition-
ally the core concern of contract law." 6
The Court emphasized that warranty law was adequate to give the
buyer "the full benefit of its bargain""' 7 while imposing reasonable
limitations on the scope of liability. By contrast, the Court stated that
recovery in tort "could subject the manufacturer to damages of an
indefinite amount."
' 18
In the absence of accident-like damage to the product itself, or to
other property of the buyer, the purchaser typically will be denied
recovery in negligence or in strict liability.' 19 A minority view exists,
however, mustering particular support in the case of negligence. For
example, in Berg v. General Motors Corp.,2 ° GM manufactured an
engine, installed by an intermediary in plaintiff's fishing boat.
12 1
When the engine malfunctioned, the plaintiff sought recovery on a
theory of negligence. 122 The damages sought were economic in
nature-lost profits resulting from curtailed operations. 123  In
112. Id. at 859.
113. Id. at 860-61.
114. Id. at 859, 861.
115. Id. at 875-76.
116. Id. at 870 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 873.
118. Id. at 874.
119. See infra Section VIII (Appendix, "The Economic Loss Doctrine in Commercial Sales
Transactions").
120. 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).





allowing recovery, the court reasoned:
The negligent manufacture of [an article purchased by persons
operating commercial ventures] poses the foreseeable risk that the
output of the entire enterprise would be diminished or even tempo-
rarily halted. The specie of harm generated by such work stoppage
(lost profits) is well within the zone of danger created and foreseen
by the negligent act.... [T]here is nothing in the tort of negligence
which prevents lost profits from being a specie of recompensable
harm which is actionable against the remote manufacturer. 1
24
Protection of the buyer may be supplemented by concerns for the
consuming public. In Ales-Peratis Foods International, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Can Co.,' 25 a packer sustained substantial financial losses when it
was unable to package quantities of abalone as a result of defective
cans supplied by the defendant. 126 In upholding the packer's negli-
gence claim, the court emphasized that the cans, if used, would have
posed hazards to consumers. 127 The court observed that society
should seek to deter the production of such defective cans and
encourage their removal from the stream of commerce when detected
by intermediaries; 128 "[s]hifting this economic loss to the can manu-
facturer accomplishes both societal objectives."'' 29 Moreover, under
these circumstances, the packer should not be given the option to pay
a lower price and obtain a less safe product. This assumes that "a
packager of foods would be willing to gamble on receiving cans which
would be not only worthless, but also if used possibly expose his cus-
tomers to harm and himself to liability."' 30
The lines sought to be drawn in these cases are artificial and
unsound. In Seely, for example, why distinguish between lost profits
attributable to the non-use of the truck and damage to the truck
resulting from an accident? Both are dollars out of Seely's pocket.
Further, Seely could have insured against accidental damage to the
truck if he had wished; a contractual allocation of that risk to Seely
would have imposed no unusual burden upon him. Similarly, the
buyer in Hales could have obtained casualty insurance to cover its fire
loss; there was no need to hold the seller accountable in tort in order
to afford protection otherwise unavailable to the buyer.
124. Id. at 593-94, 555 P.2d at 823. The decision in Berg has been superseded by a statute
prescribing the opposite result. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(6) (Supp. 1989).
125. 164 Cal. App. 3d 277, 209 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1985).
126. Id. at 280-81, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
127. Id. at 290, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25.
128. Id.
129. Id., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 925.
130. Id.
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East River reduced some of the uncertainty surrounding this
issue by rejecting distinctions respecting injury to the product sold
(thereby implicitly rejecting Seely's approach to accidental damage to
the truck). But the outcome in Hales and related cases, involving
damage to "other property," was not affected by East River. As long
as these rulings stand, it is difficult to resist the results reached in Berg
and Ales-Peratis.
If a negligent manufacturer can be held accountable for injuries
to tangible property of the buyer, why not recognize accountability
for other losses of a pecuniary character-which may be larger than
tangible property losses and more burdensome for the buyer to
absorb? The answer, quite simply, is that none of these claims should
be cognizable in tort. If there is a contract of sale, commercial losses
can be allocated in that contract-either expressly or by implication
in the absence of an express provision. One basis for the distinction in
Seely was the assumption that strict liability could not be waived by
contract.' 3 ' But the operative rule, recognized in a substantial
number of subsequent opinions, is clearly to the contrary. In the con-
text of commercial dealings, both negligence and strict liability may
be waived by contract.
132
131. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 17, 403 P.2d 145, 150, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 22
(1965). There are some decisions supporting this view. See In re Jones, 804 F.2d 1133 (10th
Cir. 1986) (Oklahoma law); Sterner Aero AB v. Page Airmotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974) (Oklahoma law); Florida Steel Corp. v. Whiting Corp., 677 F. Supp. 1140 (M.D. Fla.
1988) (Florida law); Comind, Companhia de Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div. of United
Technologies Corp., 116 F.R.D. 397 (D. Conn. 1987) (Connecticut law); Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25, 27-28 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (Iowa law);
Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 173 Mont. 345, 355, 567 P.2d 916, 922 (1977).
132. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 832 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1987) (Michigan
law) (negligence); Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 830 F.2d 1405
(7th Cir. 1987) (Wisconsin law) (negligence and strict liability); Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v.
Pargas, Inc., 722 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1984) (Illinois law) (negligence); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law) (negligence and
strict liability); S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746
(9th Cir. 1981) (California and Washington law) (negligence and strict liability); Tokio Marine
& Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980) (California law)
(negligence and strict liability); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924
(9th Cir. 1979) (Idaho law) (negligence and strict liability); Marr Enters. v. Lewis Refrig-
eration Co., 556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977) (Washington law) (negligence); Gates Rubber Co. v.
USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1975) (Illinois law) (negligence); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1974) (California law) (negligence and
strict liability), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J. Enstrom
Corp., 499 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1974) (Pennsylvania law) (negligence and strict liability);
Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.) (Arizona
and Pennsylvania law) (negligence), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970); Island Creek Coal Co. v.
Lake Shore, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285 (W.D. Va. 1986) (Michigan law) (negligence), modified on
other grounds, 832 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1987); Agristor Credit Corp. v. Schmidlin, 601 F. Supp.
1307 (D. Or. 1985) (Oregon law) (negligence and strict liability); ICI Austl. Ltd. v. Elliott
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One way of responding to the question of waiver is to hold that
strict liability is inapplicable to commercial cases. This is the
approach adopted in California, the state that produced the Seely dic-
tum. In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 133 the pur-
chaser of a defective motor sued for profits lost in the shutdown of its
plant, alleging strict liability among other theories. 134 The court held
that "products liability does not apply as between parties who: (1)
deal in a commercial setting; (2) from positions of relatively equal
economic strength; (3) bargain the specifications of the product; and
(4) negotiate concerning the risk of loss from defects in it." '35 The
court emphasized:
Since the manufacturer and buyer have bargained in a commercial
setting not only for the product but also for the measure and mode
of reimbursement for defects in the product, any societal interest in
Overseas Co., 551 F. Supp. 265 (D.N.J. 1982) (New Jersey law) (negligence and strict
liability); Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 26
(W.D. Wash. 1980) (Washington law) (negligence); Thermo King Corp. v. Strick Corp., 467
F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Pa.) (Pennsylvania law) (negligence and strict liability), aff'd mem., 609
F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1979); Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 460 F. Supp.
163 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania law) (negligence and strict liability); Lincoln Pulp & Paper
Co. v. Dravo Corp., 445 F. Supp. 507 (D. Me. 1977) (Maine law) (negligence); Cyclops Corp.
v. Home Ins. Co., 389 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (Ohio law) (negligence), aff'd per curiam,
523 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1975); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974) (Maryland and Pennsylvania law) (negligence), rev'd on unspecified
grounds, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F.
Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (New Jersey law) (negligence); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (Iowa law) (negligence); U.S.
Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (Michigan and
Pennsylvania law) (negligence), aff'd, 509 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1975); Fire Ass'n v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 129 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1955) (Iowa law) (negligence); Charles
Lachman Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (Pennsylvania law)
(negligence); Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 189 Cal. App. 3d 234, 234
Cal. Rptr. 423 (1987) (negligence); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976) (strict liability); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965) (negligence); Rawlings v. Layne &
Bowler Pump Co., 93 Idaho 496, 465 P.2d 107 (1970) (negligence); Mid-America Sprayers,
Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 8 Kan. App. 2d 451, 660 P.2d 1380 (1983) (negligence and
strict liability); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1293 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1977) (negligence); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds, Inc., 130 N.J. Super.
245, 326 A.2d 90 (Super Ct. App. Div. 1974) (negligence and strict liability); New River
Crushed Stone, Inc. v. Austin Powder Co., 24 N.C. App. 285, 210 S.E.2d 285 (1974)
(negligence); K-Lines, Inc. v. Roberts Motor Co., 273 Or. 242, 541 P.2d 1378 (1975) (strict
liability); Atlas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Moore Dry Kiln Co., 38 Or. App. 111, 589 P.2d 1134 (1979)
(negligence and strict liability); see also McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can
Never be Effective? The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 494 (1975); Note, Enforcing
Waivers in Products Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1116-18 (1983) (distinguishing commercial
losses from consumer injuries).
133. 55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1976).
134. Id. at 740, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
135. Id. at 748, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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loss shifting is absent. Whether the loss is thrust initially upon the
manufacturer or customer, it is ultimately passed along as a cost of
doing business included in the price of the products of one or the
other and thus spread over a broad commercial stream.
136
Other courts have sustained contractual allocations of risk-
including tort liability-because they perceived them to be both effi-
cient and fair. In Ebasco Services, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co.,137 an electric utility sought to recover the cost Of replacement
power made necessary by malfunctioning equipment. 138 Upholding a
limitation of liability provision against claims based on warranty, neg-
ligence, and strict liability, the court observed:
(a) [Because of the nature of the equipment], frequent forced or
scheduled outages are inevitable and cannot be completely elimi-
nated in spite of the extraordinary care and precision with which
such machinery is designed, manufactured or operated.
(b) The potential financial risk of these outages is too great for
the suppliers to assume under the prices that are charged for the
equipment. Furthermore, they could not be predicted or calcu-
lated with any precision.
(c) Utilities can manage and control the risk more efficiently and
at less cost than the suppliers.
139
A similar opinion was voiced in Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas
Aircraft Co. 140 Delta, the purchaser of an airplane from Douglas,
brought an action against the manufacturer to recover for damages
sustained by the aircraft when a nose wheel collapsed.141 Delta
asserted that the manufacturer was negligent, but a provision in the
purchase contract excused Douglas in the event of negligence:
14 2
Under the contract before us, Delta (or its insurance carrier if any)
bears that risk in return for a purchase price acceptable to it; had
the clause been removed, the risk would have fallen on Douglas (or
its insurance carrier if any), but in return for an increased price
deemed adequate by it to compensate for the risk assumed. We
can see no reason why Delta, having determined, as a matter of
business judgment, that the price fixed justified assuming the risk
of loss, should now be allowed to shift the risk so assumed to
Douglas, which had neither agreed to assume it nor been compen-
136. Id.
137. 460 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
138. Id. at 167.
139. Id. at 222.
140. 238 Cal. App. 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965).
141. Id. at 97, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
142. Id. at 97, 100, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 519, 521.
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sated for such assumption.' 43
While these cases reflect the general view, some courts have
expressed a reluctance to permit waivers of negligence and strict lia-
bility, particularly in cases where products pose a risk of physical
injury to person or property. For example, in Salt River Project Agri-
cultural Improvement & Power District v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.," a gas turbine generator purchased by Salt River from West-
inghouse exploded-causing $1.9 million in damage to itself and $50
thousand in consequential damages.' 45 The.court sustained a limita-
tion of liability clause as to Salt River's warranty claim,'46 but
remanded for further hearings as to the applicability of the limitation
to Salt River's claim in strict product liability.' 47 In so deciding, the
court emphasized that the "law frowns upon tort disclaimers because
they tend to undermine the prophylactic principles of tort law" that
provide incentives to produce safe products. 4 There are a number of
other decisions to the same effect. 149 An extreme example is Held v.
Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc. 15 0 In Held, the purchaser of an
aircraft sought to recover for damages incurred in a crash, arguing
143. Id. at 104-05, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 524. There was evidence that Douglas had been
prepared to provide a more extensive warranty for a higher price. Id. at 103 n.5, 47 Cal. Rptr.
at 523 n.5; accord Appalachian Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 1, 262
Cal. Rptr. 716 (1989).
144. 143 Ariz. 368, 694 P.2d 198 (1984).
145. Id. at 372, 374, 378, 694 P.2d at 202, 204, 208.
146. Id. at 374, 694 P.2d at 204.
147. Id. at 384-85, 694 P.2d at 214-15.
148. Id. at 384, 694 P.2d at 214.
149. JIG The Third Corp. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 519 F.2d 171 (5th
Cir. 1975) (admiralty) (negligence and strict liability), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976);
Feeders, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., No. Civ. 4-77-306 (D. Minn. May 15, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (negligence); Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D.
Ohio 1979) (Ohio law) (negligence and strict liability); Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v. Dravo
Corp., 436 F. Supp. 262 (D. Me. 1977) (Pennsylvania law) (negligence); Boone Valley Coop.
Processing Ass'n v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974) (Iowa law)
(negligence and strict liability); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Pa. 1968) (Pennsylvania law) (negligence), rev'd on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp.
170 (D. Or. 1968) (Oregon law) (negligence and strict liability); Southern Cal. Edison Co. v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 120 Cal. App. 3d 842, 175 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1981) (negligence and strict
liability); Basin Oil Co. v. Baash-Ross Tool Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 578, 271 P.2d 122 (1954)
(negligence); Ivey Plants, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 282 So. 2d 205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(negligence), cert. denied, 289 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1974); Manning v. International Harvester Co.,
381 N.W.2d 376 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (negligence); Fleming v. Stoddard Wendle Motor Co.,
70 Wash. 2d 465, 423 P.2d 926 (1967) (negligence); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584 (1986) (negligence). But cf. Lincoln Pulp & Paper Co. v.
Dravo Corp., 445 F. Supp. 507 (D. Me. 1977) (Maine law) (negligence).
150. 672 F. Supp. 369 (D. Minn. 1987) (Texas law).
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that the aircraft had been negligently designed.151 The contract of
sale provided that the seller's repair-or-replace warranty was "in lieu
of all other obligations, liabilities and duties [of the seller] for any loss,
expense, or damage arising out [sic] the sale, use or operation of the
[aircraft], whether caused by [the seller's] negligence or otherwise."' 52
The court held that because "[t]he clause does not refer to losses aris-
ing out of design defects ... it is not effective to preclude an action
based on negligent design."'
' 5 3
Accordingly, the availability of an action in negligence or in
strict product liability may be significant, even in circumstances in
which the parties are said to be free to reallocate risks, if in practice
courts adopt hostile attitudes towards contractual provisions that seek
to achieve just such a reallocation. Business uncertainties could be
reduced, and the relevant issues could be more sharply focused, if
commercial buyers were compelled to rely exclusively on the contract
remedies of the UCC. The Code provides for the recovery of all cate-
gories of damage-to the product itself, to other tangible property,
and to the profitability of the buyer's business-but the UCC also pro-
vides a structured basis for allocating risks of loss, one generally
respected by the courts.
B. Misrepresentation
In the context of product liability, the law of misrepresentation is
unusually complex. If physical harm results from a misrepresenta-
tion, liability may be premised on either negligence'54 or strict prod-
uct liability.'55 If, however, the only loss is pecuniary, the
Restatement of Torts allows recovery if the misrepresentation is the
product of negligence,' 56 but affords only limited relief (in the nature
of restitution) if the representation is innocent.5 7
In judicial determinations involving pecuniary loss, the courts
are divided. The leading case sustaining liability is Randy Knitwear,
151. Id. at 372-73.
152. Id. at 383.
153. Id. at 384.
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1977).
155. Id. § 402B.
156. Id. § 552. Although Section 552 is normally applied to suppliers of information and
not to suppliers of goods, its terms are not so limited, and it has been invoked in some
commercial sales transactions. See, e.g., United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 587
F. Supp. 49 (D. Colo. 1984) (lease of computer system), rev'd on other grounds, 640 F. Supp.
350 (D. Colo. 1985).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C. For a discussion of the evolution of the
Restatement position and its consistency (or inconsistency) with precedent and general legal
principles, see Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentations, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1973).
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Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. 158 In Randy Knitwear, American
Cyanamid manufactured resins, which were sold to fabric manufac-
turers (Apex and Fairtex), for use in treating fabrics to make them
shrink-resistant. 5 9 Randy bought fabric from Apex and Fairtex, and,
when the fabric shrank, Randy sued Apex, Fairtex, and American
Cyanamid for pecuniary loss."6  American Cyanamid defended
against warranty liability by arguing that there was no privity. 6 ' The
court upheld Randy's claim on the basis of misrepresentation, finding
that American Cyanamid had made representations as to the shrink-
resistant quality of fabrics treated with its resins by advertising its
product, and by permitting Apex and Fairtex to use labels attesting to
the use of American Cyanamid's product.1 62 The court reasoned:
We perceive no warrant for holding ... that strict liability
should not here be imposed because the defect involved, fabric
shrinkage, is not likely to cause personal harm or injury.... Since
the basis of liability turns not upon the character of the product
but upon the representation, there is no justification for a distinc-
tion on the basis of the type of injury suffered or the type of article
or goods involved. 63
While the opinion is premised on a theory of misrepresentation,
Randy Knitwear could be viewed in more traditional terms, as one
permitting recovery for breach of express warranty notwithstanding
an absence of privity.
Other courts, however, have based liability on tortious misrepre-
sentation in circumstances in which a warranty claim could not have
been sustained. In Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp.,64 for
example, the buyer of an electronic data processing system sued the
supplier for breach of warranty and for fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion. 165 The court held that the warranty claim was barred by a dis-
claimer,1 66 but that the fraud claim was actionable even though: (1)
the misrepresentation (as to the capability of the system) was neither
deliberate nor negligent; (2) the only losses sustained were economic
in character; and (3) the contract contained an integration clause pur-
porting to bar reliance upon oral representations.167
158. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
159. Id. at 8-9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
160. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
161. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 364-65.
162. Id. at 9, 181 N.E.2d at 400, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
163. Id. at 15, 181 N.E.2d at 403-04, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70.
164. 444 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1971) (Minnesota law).
165. Id. at 174.
166. Id. at 190.
167. Id. at 176, 178, 190-91; accord Vicon, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 657 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1981)
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There are divergent views on this type of case. In Wisconsin
Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 65 the buyer of a
transformer sought to recover for misrepresentation after the war-
ranty on the transformer had expired. ' 69 The buyer claimed that the
transformer was not free of defects as the seller had represented.,
70
The court rejected this claim, observing that the challenged
representation:
[was] not a material representation, but is rather a promise to
replace or repair such goods should there prove to be such defects.
It is a promise of future performance of a duty that is limited by
the terms of a warranty. If plaintiffs in this case can go forward
with such a claim, it is clear that no warranty limitations can be
effective. Warranties could no longer be limited in time or as to
remedies. 171
(Tennessee law) (false representation of capacity of asphalt plant); Northern States Power Co.
v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 550 F. Supp. 108 (D. Minn. 1982) (Minnesota law) (failure
of anchor bolts causing physical damage and economic loss; possible fraud); Walker Truck
Contractors, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 405 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (Tennessee law)
(defective truck); Board of Educ. v. A, C & S, Inc., 171 11. App. 3d 737, 525 N.E.2d 950
(1988) (asbestos insulation posing health hazard); Irwin v. Carlton, 369 Mich. 92, 119 N.W.2d
617 (1963) (diseased hogs represented as healthy; infection of buyer's entire herd); St. Croix
Printing Equip., Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(defective printing press); County of Chenango Indus. Dev. Agency v. Lockwood Greene
Eng'rs, Inc., 114 A.D.2d 728, 494 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1985) (defective roof); Jasper Aviation, Inc.
v. McCollum Aviation, Inc., 497 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1972) (aircraft in need of repair); Walker
v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971) (floor surfacing caused offensive odor,
requiring replacement of inventory and renovation of store); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217
Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966) (defective tractor); Cooper Paintings & Coatings, Inc. v.
SCM Corp., 62 Tenn. App. 13, 457 S.W.2d 864 (1970) (defective roofing material); Ford
Motor Co. v. Taylor, 60 Tenn. App. 271, 446 S.W.2d 521 (1969) (defective tractor). These
cases all involve varying degrees of culpability on the part of the seller. Even in cases where
the misrepresentations were described as "innocent," as in Clements, there may well have been
negligence or reckless disregard of the truth.
168. 645 F. Supp. 1129 (W.D. Wis. 1986) (Wisconsin law), aff'd, 830 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.
1987).
169. Id. at 1134-35.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1137; accord Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1985)
(New Jersey law) (warping of plastic trays); Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d
1291, 1294 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980) (Florida law) (adequacy of computer system); Flow Indus.,
Inc. v. Fields Constr. Co., 683 F. Supp. 527 (D. Md. 1988) (Maryland law) (delay in delivery
of pumps); Radionic Indus., Inc. v. GTE Prods. Corp., 665 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Il. 1987)
(Illinois law) (defective light bulbs); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F.
Supp. 49 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (Ohio law) (defective nuclear power station); Wood Prods., Inc. v.
CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641 (D. Md. 1986) (Maryland law) (defective furnace); Collegiate
Enters. v. Otis Elevator Co., 650 F. Supp. 116 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (Missouri law) (defective
elevators); United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 640 F. Supp. 350 (D. Colo. 1985)
(Colorado law) (suitability of computer system); Unifoil Corp. v. Cheque Printers & Encoders,
Ltd., 622 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.J. 1985) (New Jersey law) (defective aluminum foil); Dixie-
Portland Flour Mills, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 613 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. 11. 1985) (Illinois law)
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In addition to divergent views on whether misrepresentation
actions are available in commercial sales transactions, there is disa-
greement as to the efficacy of disclaimers and other limitations on
liability. 7 2 There is also disagreement on whether the parol evidence
rule, fortified by contract provisions purporting to bar both prior
agreements and reliance on prior representations, is effective to
exclude misrepresentation claims.173
(sand mixed in with flour); National Can Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 505 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill.
198 1) (Illinois law) (defective seals); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Waukesha Bearings Corp.,
502 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. La. 1980) (admiralty law) (deficiency in ceramic coated lining);
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982) (defective
storage tank); Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 117 Ill. App. 3d 304, 453 N.E.2d 8 (1983)
(defective roofing materials); Black, Jackson & Simmons Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 109 III. App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 282 (1982) (adequacy of computer
system); Boatel Indus., Inc. v. Hester, 77 Md. App. 284, 550 A.2d 389 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988)
(unseaworthy yacht); Westfield Chem. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1293 (Mass. Super Ct. 1977) (adequacy of computer system); Rio Grande Jewelers
Supply, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 101 N.M. 798, 689 P.2d 1269 (1984) (adequacy of computer
system); cf. Sullivan v. Allegheny Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 351, 423 A.2d 1292
(1980) (limiting damages to restitutionary relief for deficient truck engine).
One case, however, goes too far. In Werner & Pfleiderer Corp. v. Gary Chem. Co., 697 F.
Supp. 808 (D.N.J. 1988) (New Jersey law), the court refused to allow a claim of fraud in a
dispute between commercial entities of relatively equal bargaining power. The seller was
charged with knowingly delivering a machine that could not meet the guaranteed production
rates specified in the contract. The buyer was limited to remedies under the contract or the
UCC. Id. at 814-15. But if the contract had been induced by fraud, the buyer should not be
bound by the contract and should be permitted to invoke the full range of tort remedies.
172. For cases sustaining disclaimers, see S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v.
Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1981) (Washington law); 21st Century Properties Co. v.
Carpenter Insulation & Coatings Co., 694 F. Supp. 148 (D. Md. 1988) (Maryland law);
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572 (D.D.C. 1974)
(Maryland law), rev'd on unspecified grounds, 527 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1975). None of the
cases discussed the issue at any length.
For cases rejecting disclaimers, see Vicon, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 657 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.
1981) (Tennessee law); M-A-S-H, Inc. v. Fiat-Allis Constr. Mach. Inc., 461 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.
Tenn. 1978) (Tennessee law), aff'd per curiam, 627 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir. 1980); Walker Truck
Contractors, Inc. v. Crane Carrier Co., 405 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (Tennessee law);
Laudisio v. Amoco Oil Co., 108 Misc. 2d 245, 437 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1981). In the first
three cases, it was unclear whether the courts' rulings were that liability could not be
disclaimed, or that the contract terms had simply failed to disclaim liability in the particular
cases. In Laudisio, moreover, the discussion appears to have been directed to fraud. In other
cases, fraud was also at issue and disclaimers were held to be ineffective. See Agristor Leasing
v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1986) (Tennessee law); Price Bros. v. Olin Constr. Co., 528
F. Supp. 716 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (New York law); O'Neil v. International Harvester Co., 40
Colo. App. 369, 575 P.2d 862 (1978); George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros., 220
Va. 109, 255 S.E.2d 682 (1979).
173. See, e.g., Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Goren Equip. Co., 576 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (Georgia law) (merger clause precluded buyer reliance on alleged fraudulent
misrepresentations); Tinker v. De Maria Porsche Audi, Inc., 459 So. 2d 487 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (merger clause vitiated by fraud; consumer case), review denied, 471 So. 2d 43 (Fla.
1985); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 232 Ga. 766, 208 S.E.2d 794 (1974) (merger clause
vitiated by fraud); Jordan v. Doonan Truck & Equip., Inc., 220 Kan. 431, 552 P.2d 881 (1976)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Two recent cases illustrate some of the complexities involved. In
Public Service Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., ' the buyer of a
steam turbine generator claimed that the seller had been guilty of
fraud in failing to provide the buyer with timely information on the
malfunctions of other turbines of the same type.'75 The buyer's tur-
bine sustained damage subsequent to these other incidents and after
the expiration of the warranty on its turbine.'7 6 The court rejected
the buyer's claim, stating that to "[a]llow[] the claim to be brought
under a theory of intentional tort (herein, fraud) would effectively
bypass the entire body of contract law."' l77  A similar result was
reached on similar facts in Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. '78 There, the seller's
engineers knew of prior turbine malfunctions at the time of the sale to
the buyer, but the seller's sales personnel did not obtain this informa-
tion until a later date (at which time the buyer was notified). 79 The
court refused to allow the nondisclosure to serve as the basis for an
action of tortious misrepresentation or as a basis for invalidating the
seller's warranty limitations; '80 it found that the seller's conduct did
not amount to "overreaching or sharp practices. '
(merger clause precluded reliance on oral representations; fraud negated; consumer case);
Deerfield Commodities, Ltd. v. Nerco, Inc., 72 Or. App. 305, 696 P.2d 1096 (merger clause
precluded seller reliance on alleged fraudulent misrepresentations), review denied, 299 Or. 314,
702 P.2d 1111 (1985).
In St. Croix Printing Equipment, Inc. v. Rockwell International Corp., 428 N.W.2d 877
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988), a trial was ordered to determine whether a buyer had justifiably relied
on a seller's oral representations antedating a written contract disclaiming warranties. The
court observed that "when a party is suing for breach of warranty and misrepresentation, it is
clear that they are trying to get around the contract provisions." Id. at 881. In view of the
experience of these parties, the court found that the buyer arguably had "understood the
consequences of a final written agreement." Id. at 882.
174. 685 F. Supp. 1281 (D.N.H. 1988) (New Hampshire law).
175. Id. at 1282, 1289-90.
176. Id. at 1283-84.
177. Id. at 1290.
178. 844 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1988) (Texas law).
179. Id. at 1184.
180. Id.
181. Id. There is a division in the cases on whether warranty limitations can be
circumvented by charging the seller with the tort of negligently failing to warn the buyer of
deficiencies discovered subsequent to sale. For decisions supporting such a duty, see Miller
Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813 (11 th Cir. 1984) (negligent failure to warn
actionable under admiralty law); McConnell v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520
(D.N.J. 1986) (same). But most courts have refused to permit recovery for negligent failure to
warn when the claim was for economic loss. See Nicor Supply Ships v. General Motors Corp.,
876 F.2d 501 (5th 1989) (admiralty); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore Inc., 692 F. Supp.
629 (W.D. Va. 1988) (Michigan law); Frey Dairy v. A.O. Smith Harvestore, 680 F. Supp. 253
(E.D. Mich. 1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1989) (Michigan law); Zidell, Inc. v. Cargo
Freight, 661 F. Supp. 960 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (admiralty); Allen v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F.
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In commercial sales transactions, the tort of misrepresentation is
largely redundant. If a seller makes material representations which
turn out to be false, the buyer can sue for breach of express warranty.
If a seller fails to make disclosures about an inferior or defective prod-
uct, the buyer can sue for breach of implied warranty. In both cases,
the claims of the aggrieved buyer are subject to the terms of the
seller's warranty, including limitations on liability and restrictions on
remedy. Even so,'a seller would not be protected against all chal-
lenges. In cases involving deliberate fraud, a court would be justified
in striking down these contractual impediments to the buyer's
claim182 and permitting recovery for misrepresentation as well as for
breach of warranty. In most instances, however, the warranty claim
should suffice to protect the buyer.
183
As in the case of negligence and strict liability, the issues will be
more sharply focused and the contractual allocations of risk more
generally respected if aggrieved buyers are compelled to proceed
under the Uniform Commercial Code.
IV. THE ECONOMICS OF RISK ALLOCATION
The Uniform Commercial Code, as well as many of the judicial
decisions concerned with contractual allocations of risk, assume that
it is socially desirable to permit contracting parties to allocate risks.
That assumption is sound, at least in the context of the commercial
sales transactions examined in this Article. The assumption requires
further explication, however, including a consideration of applicable
limits. Should contractual allocations of risk be sustained despite ine-
quality of bargaining power between buyer and seller? Is the case for
contractual allocations undermined by imperfections in the knowl-
edge of the contracting parties? We begin with the general case and
then consider possible limitations.
Supp. 381 (D.N.M. 1984) (New Mexico law); Utah Int'l v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 N.M.
539, 775 P.2d 741 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989); Continental Ins. Co. v. Page Eng'g Co., 783 P.2d 641
(Wyo. 1989). For a further discussion of the duty to warn subsequent to sale, see Schwartz,
The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 892 (1983).
If the position in this Article is adopted and the law of torts is held to be inapplicable to
commercial sales transactions, a post-sale duty to warn could be imposed as a matter of
contract law. As such, it would be amenable to more precise definition in the contract of
sale-to the same extent as other specifications are made respecting the responsibilities of the
seller.
182. The term "deliberate fraud" refers to statements known to be false and statements
made by the seller without regard to their truth or falsity, with the intention of inducing
reliance by the prospective buyer.
183. See U.C.C. § 2-721 (1987); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1979).
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A. The Logic of Risk Allocation
The assumption of additional risk by the manufacturer, in the
form of additional warranty responsibility, increases the manufac-
turer's costs in three ways: (1) product quality must be monitored to
reduce the number of product failures; (2) a reserve must be accumu-
lated (or an equivalent liability assumed) to compensate buyers for
defects that occur despite improved quality control; and (3) transac-
tion costs are incurred in processing warranty claims.
A buyer benefits from additional warranty protection in two
ways: (1) to the extent that there are fewer product failures, the buyer
will experience fewer incidents of damage to the purchased product,
to other property of the buyer, and to the conduct of the buyer's busi-
ness; and (2) to the extent that compensation is provided for product
failures, the costs of any failures that do occur will be borne by the
manufacturer rather than by the buyer. Like the manufacturer, the
buyer incurs transaction costs in submitting warranty claims; the
buyer's recovery will be reduced by such costs.
From a social perspective, it is desirable to extend warranty pro-
tection when the benefits to the buyer exceed the costs to the manu-
facturer. If the converse is true, and warranty costs exceed warranty
benefits, warranty protection should be curtailed.
The typical manufacturer's warranty has three features: (1) a
commitment, for a limited period, to repair or replace defective prod-
ucts or parts; (2) a disclaimer of all other warranties, express or
implied; and (3) an exclusion of any liability for consequential dam-
ages. Under a wide range of circumstances, this form of warranty is
likely to be more efficient than the statutorily prescribed remedies of
the UCC. Consider the three general categories of commercial loss:
1. Damage or destruction of the purchased product. If the dam-
age or destruction occurs within the warranty period and is a result of
a product defect , the manufacturer is generally in the best position to
provide a remedy of repair or replacement. It has the advantage of
knowing its own product; it has the benefits of specialization and per-
haps of economies of scale; and it can avoid the problem of moral
hazard that arises if a buyer is free to spend the seller's money, with
only loose constraints, in unilaterally obtaining replacement or repair.
At the same time, the buyer is protected as long as the courts condi-
tion the exclusivity of the repair-or-replace remedy on timely and
effective action by the manufacturer.'84
2. Damage to other property of the buyer. Focusing initially on
184. See supra notes 48, 50-51.
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casualty losses (fires, explosions, and the like), the buyer may or may
not be in the best position to avert the mishap. But the buyer is
clearly in the best position to insure against the loss. The standard
casualty policy protects the buyer from losses associated with acci-
dents caused by product failures, without segregation of risks or
charges. The premium on such policies will be related to the value of
the buyer's property and the general risk involved in the buyer's activ-
ities."8 5 These are matters about which the seller has limited knowl-
edge and almost no control. As to such losses, the buyer is in the best
position to obtain optimal coverage under its own policy, described as
first-party insurance. 186 The same insurance would apply to damages
to the purchased product, occurring after the expiration of the war-
ranty period, as long as the loss is a casualty loss.
The avoidance of unnecessary transaction costs is a major advan-
tage of having the buyer look to its own insurance company. Litiga-
tion over the liability of the seller can consume substantial resources,
whether the suit is ultimately resolved in favor of the buyer or the
seller.
3. Damage to the business of the buyer (including noncasualty
property losses). Again, the buyer may or may not be in the best posi-
tion to avert the mishap, but it is clearly in the best position to insure
against the loss. The manufacturer-seller cannot obtain insurance
against noncasualty losses to the buyer's business.18 7 By contrast, the
buyer can obtain various types of insurance to guard against losses
attributable to business interruption.""8 Further, the buyer can struc-
185. See H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, J. MELONE & R. ZELTEN, RISK AND INSURANCE
460-65, 596-97 (2d ed. 1974); R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 621-30 (5th ed. 1966). For a discussion of the classification of insurance risks, see
K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 67-
100 (1986).
186. First-party insurance also enables the buyer and his insurance company to negotiate
terms that are finely tuned to the costs and risks at stake, such as, ceilings, deductibles,
copayments, and exclusions. See Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability
Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 305 (1988).
187. See 2 R. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11.01, at 11-9 to 11-13,
§ 11.10, at 11-80 to 11-82 (1989); Arness & Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property
Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Cases, 72 VA. L. REV. 943, 949, 962-69 (1986);
Sorensen, Initial Investigation of Products Liability Claims, 1974 INS. L.J. 255, 280; Note,
Products Liability Insurance Coverage, 31 S.C.L. REV. 718, 749-52 (1980). For an illustrative
case, see Yakima Cement Prods. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 93 Wash. 2d 210, 219, 608 P.2d
254, 259 (1980) ('Consequential damages arising from intangible injury may be awarded only
when they result directly from injury to or destruction of tangible property." In the absence of
property damage arising from defective concrete panels, the expenses of a customer's
construction delay were not recoverable.).
188. See A. MILLER, "TYPES OF BUSINESS INTERRUPTION COVERAGE AVAILABLE" IN
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE: A PRIMER 4-5, 18-20 (1987); R. MORRISON,
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ture its operations (by maintaining spare parts, excess capacity, alter-
native operating modes, and the like) so as to minimize any
compounding of losses.
Holding the manufacturer responsible for losses to the buyer's
business is inherently inefficient because of problems of adverse selec-
tion. Assume, for example, that a machine has a probability of failure
of .001 (despite all cost-justified quality control measures). Assume
further that the machine is used in businesses with differing degrees of
sensitivity to product failure. In A's business, a machine failure will
cause losses of $5,000; in B's business, the losses will be $50,000; and
in C's business, the losses will be $500,000. If the manufacturer sells
the same number of machines to A, B, and C, it would have to charge
a premium of $185 per machine to cover the risks assumed (($555,000
x .001)/ 3).
This premium would be clearly excessive in the case of A and B,
resulting in either: (1) discontinuance of their use of a machine other-
wise suitable for their businesses; or (2) burdening their businesses
with costs associated with C's operations-reducing the attractive-
ness, in terms of price and quality, of the products they sell. C, in
turn, is subsidized to the extent that A and B bear part of the costs of
C's operations, which are highly sensitive to product failure.
One way of resolving the problem would be for the manufacturer
to discriminate in price, charging A a $5 premium, B a $50 premium,
and C a $500 premium (totaling the necessary $555). This approach,
however, requires a degree of knowledge not available to manufactur-
ers: information about the nature of each buyer's operations, not only
at the time of sale, but subsequent to the sale (as long as the buyers do
not change their operations so dramatically as to afford the manufac-
turer a defense of unforeseeability). '89 Clearly the preferable solution,
and the one most compatible with access to relevant information, is to
have each buyer assume the risk of disruption of its own business and
obtain insurance (or self-insure) against the risk. In effect, A would
pay a premium to its own insurance company based on $5,000 per
failure; B would pay a premium based on $50,000 per failure; and C
would pay a premium based on $500,000 per failure.
If the UCC's allocation of risks is inefficient in many instances, is
this a serious shortcoming in the Code? Not necessarily. It would be
difficult to formulate a universally applicable repair-or-replace war-
ranty--considering, among other things, the duration of the warranty
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE: ITS THEORY AND PRACTICE 73-76 (1986) (describing
some of the risks against which insurance can be obtained).
189. See supra notes 75-76.
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and the possible exclusions of particular risks from warranty cover-
age. Moreover, the UCC's formulation may be appropriate for iso-
lated ad hoc transactions in which the parties do not explicitly
address the question of risk allocation. By placing the major initial
responsibility on sellers, the UCC provides an incentive for sellers to
formulate more precise solutions, suitable to their particular needs,
and to apprise buyers of the degree of warranty protection afforded.
In effect, the UCC forces the seller's hand and compels the seller to
devise warranty limitations that are efficient in the context of transac-
tions between the seller and its customers.
B. Controlling the Incidence of Loss
The typical repair-or-replace warranty appears to be efficient
from the perspective of optimal insurance, considering, inter alia,
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. But is this warranty
efficient in reducing the risk of loss associated with product defects?
Courts resistant to contractual reallocations of risk express concern
about the erosion of "prophylactic principles of tort law" that provide
incentives to produce safe products.190 The discussion thus far has
maintained an attitude of agnosticism on whether the buyer or the
seller is in the best position to avoid losses stemming from product
defects.
As to the defect itself, control clearly rests with the seller. As to
the consequences of the defect, the buyer exercises significant control,
both in the manner in which the product is used and in precautions
taken to avoid loss (such as periodic inspections and sensitivity to
signs of trouble). In sum, the problem is one of joint care. In such
cases, it is not possible to devise a liability rule that is optimal in all
instances. For example, the diligence of the seller may be enhanced
by increasing the probability that the seller will be held accountable
for losses resulting from product defects. But the enhancement of
seller diligence comes at the expense of buyer caution: The more
probable it is that the seller will be held liable, the less care the buyer
will take.
If, for example, a product defect will cause a loss of $100,000 and
the probability of that loss can be reduced by one percent by a seller
expenditure of $700, the expenditure, viewed in isolation, should be
made (.01 X $100,000 > $700). Similarly, if the consequences of
product failure can be reduced by one percent by a buyer expenditure
of $700, that expenditure, viewed in isolation, should also be made (an
190. See supra notes 144-48.
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identical calculation). Whether it is efficient for both parties to make
the precautionary expenditures depends on the interaction between
the two efforts. If the combined effects of the efforts of the buyer and
seller are largely redundant-achieving a gain of $1,000 at a cost of
$1,400-the expenditure of one of the parties is a waste. Under such
circumstances, only one of the parties should make the precautionary
expenditure. If the efforts are substantially independent, each achiev-
ing a gain of $1,000 at a cost of $700, both expenditures should be
made. In most cases, the combined effects will be somewhere between
these two extremes. No rule of law can make the appropriate distinc-
tions, at least not with any precision, because the relationship between
the efforts of buyers and sellers is strongly influenced by factors that
are specific to particular transactions. 19'
This problem lends itself to a negotiated solution in which risks
are allocated, each party assuming the responsibilities that are cost-
effective in light of the responsibilities assumed by the other. More
specifically, a seller offers a product accompanied by a warranty of
particular scope at a certain price. A buyer can then seek to obtain
more warranty protection (at a higher price) or less warranty protec-
tion (at a lower price) depending on whether the initial allocation
assigned too little or too much responsibility to the seller. In making
its determination, the buyer will consider: (1) the nature and magni-
tude of losses anticipated in the event of product failure; (2) the meas-
ures at the buyer's disposal to avoid or limit such losses; and (3)
whether protection against such losses can be achieved more economi-
cally by negotiating a modification of the seller's warranty responsibil-
ities (for example, by paying more to obtain additional protection).
At this point, an objection may be made that in most transac-
tions no negotiation takes place. The buyer is confronted with a war-
ranty term that is designed by the seller and tendered to the buyer on
a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We now turn to instances in which negotia-
tion of warranty terms is either unavailable or uninformed. Under
such circumstances, can it be said that contractual allocations of risk
are efficient and socially desirable?
C. Objections to Contractual Allocations of Risk
For present purposes, we assume that the contractual allocation
191. For other discussions of the problem of joint care, see S. SHAVELL, supra note 81, at
26-29 (affirming the absence of any single rule yielding optimal results in all cases of joint
care); Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 3-19 (1985) (discussing efficient solutions in accident and contract cases); Priest, A
Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1307-13 (1981) (emphasizing
significance of buyer as well as seller precaution).
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of risk is not concealed, disguised, or misleading-that is, the parties
are informed about the nature of the contractual provision. Under
this assumption, two objections may be raised: (1) The contractual
provision is not necessarily efficient because it is not freely selected in
a competitive market, but is instead imposed by the unilateral action
of a powerful seller dictating to a weak buyer; and (2) the contractual
provision is not necessarily efficient because the parties (particularly
the buyer) are not sufficiently apprised of the risks posed by product
defects. We will consider each objection in turn and explore interac-
tions between the two.
1. PROBLEMS OF MARKET POWER
We assume, initially, that the seller's market is competitive and
that both parties are knowledgeable about the risks posed by defective
products. If under these circumstances an improved warranty will
cost sellers $100 per unit and yield benefits to buyers of $150 per unit,
the improved warranty will be provided. If the improved warranty is
presently being offered, a manufacturer withholding the warranty
could offer a price reduction of $100. Knowledgeable buyers, how-
ever, would shun such a proposal because it offers a savings of $100 at
a cost of $150. If the improved warranty is not presently being
offered, an innovative producer could increase its market share or
raise its price (or both) by offering the improved warranty. For exam-
ple, an offer of the improved warranty at a price increase of $125
would be attractive to the innovator and to customers alike, each
gaining $25 per unit over the existing regime. Emulation of the inno-
vator will yield a market in which the improved warranty is offered at
cost ($100 per unit), with customers reaping a net gain of $50 per unit
over the prior price/product combination. In sum, efficient warran-
ties will drive out inefficient warranties in markets characterized by
competitive conditions and knowledgeable participants.
Does market power make a difference? Take the extreme case in
which the seller is a monopolist (but retaining the premise that both
parties are knowledgeable). Assume, once again, that the improved
warranty costs the seller $100 per unit and provides buyers with bene-
fits of $150 per unit. Assume further that the seller, a monopolist, has
established a profit-maximizing price of $1,050 per unit. It would be
in the interest of both parties to increase the price to $1,175 and to
provide the improved warranty. Buyers would achieve a net gain of
$25 per unit and, therefore, would not buy less. The monopolist
would obtain $25 additional profit per unit and, in addition, would be
able to sell additional units (the number depending on elasticity of
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demand). Assume, for example, that the initial demand and cost
schedule confronting the monopolist is as follows:
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
5800 1,065.00 600 465.00 2,697,000
5900 1,057.50 600 457.50 2,699,250
6000 1,050.00* 600 450.00 2,700,000
6100 1,042.50 600 442.50 2,699,250
6200 1,035.00 600 435.00 2,697,200
6300 1,027.50 600 427.50 2,693,250
6400 1,020.00 600 420.00 2,688,000
6500 1,012.50 600 412.50 2,681,250
* Profit-maximizing price.
The addition of the improved warranty would increase cost by
$100 per unit, but would increase demand at every point by $150.
Thus:
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
5800 1,215.00 700 515.00 2,987,000
5900 1,207.50 700 507.50 2,994,250
6000 1,200.00 700 500.00 3,000,000
6100 1,192.50 700 492.50 3,004,250
6200 1,185.00 700 485.00 3,007,000
6300 1,177.50* 700 477.50 3,008,250
6400 1,170.00 700 470.00 3,008,000
6500 1,162.50 700 462.50 3,006,250
* Approximate profit-maximizing price.
At the new profit-maximizing price of $1,175 (derived by inter-
polation), output is 6337 units (an increase of 337 units) and total
profits are $3,010,075 (an increase of $310,075). At the same time,
the value of the product to the buyer is increased by $25-the old
price ($1,050) plus the value of the improved warranty ($150) minus
the new price ($1,175).
The same reasoning applies to markets that are imperfectly com-
petitive, but not fully monopolized: (1) markets characterized by
product differentiation in which each producer has some discretion
over price because of the distinctiveness of its product; and (2) mar-
kets characterized by small numbers of producers engaged in
nonrivalrous behavior (including instances of overt and tacit
collusion).
In the case of product differentiation, each producer is a limited
monopolist. Within the bounds set by imperfect substitutes, a pro-
ducer can raise its price without losing all patronage and can lower its
price without necessarily triggering responses by rivals. The demand
curve faced by each producer is the same as the demand curve faced
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by a true monopolist, except that the elasticity of demand is much
greater: relatively small changes in price will induce relatively large
changes in output as buyers turn to imperfect substitutes. The differ-
ence, however, is of no significance. A monopolist, whether facing a
demand curve of high or low elasticity, can achieve higher profits
(and increased output) by offering optimal warranty protection. The
analysis of the monopoly case is not dependent on the elasticity of
demand confronting the monopolist and is fully applicable to
instances of imperfect competition premised on product
differentiation. 
192
As to firms acting in concert, whether overtly or tacitly, the
starting point is again the monopoly model. Taking the example pre-
viously stated, assume that there are now three firms: each sells 2,000
units of output at a price of $1,050 and a cost of $600; and each
receives a $900,000 share in monopoly profits ($2,700,000 + 3). It
would be in the interest of all three participants to move to an
improved warranty at a price of $1,175 and a cost of $750. Total
output would increase by 337 units, presumably shared pro rata, and
192. Consider a monopolist (or producer of a differentiated product) facing an elastic
demand curve:
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
4,750 705 600 105 498,750
5,000 700* 600 100 500,000
5,250 695 600 95 498,750
5,500 690 600 90 495,000
5,750 685 600 85 488,750
6,000 680 600 80 480,000
6,250 675 600 75 468,750
6,500 670 600 70 455,000
* Profit-maximizing price.
If an improved warranty increases cost by $100 and demand by $150, the new situation facing
the producer is:
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
4,750 855 700 155 736,250
5,000 850 700 150 750,000
5,250 845 700 145 761,250
5,500 840 700 140 770,700
5,750 835 700 135 776,250
6,000 830 700 130 780,000
6,250 825* 700 125 781,250
6,500 820 700 120 780,000
* Profit-maximizing price.
Accordingly, the adoption of the improved warranty enables the producer to increase output
from 5,000 units to 6,250 units and to increase its profit from $500,000 to $781,250.
For a discussion of the similarity between pricing decisions under conditions of monopoly
and under conditions of product differentiation, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 15-16, 385 (2d ed. 1980). For a discussion of the
economics of product differentiation, see id. at 384-405.
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each firm would increase its pro rata share of industry profit from
$900,000 to $1,003,358. Just as a monopolist would find it advanta-
geous to give an improved warranty, the firms comprising a shared
monopoly would find it advantageous to do so. The improved war-
ranty would increase the industry profit to be shared among the sell-
ers, thereby increasing their individual shares. 93
The need for concerted action is not an impediment. Once the
193. This conclusion holds true regardless of the manner in which industry output is shared
and regardless of the relative efficiency of the market participants. Assume, for example, that
the industry leader controls 40% of output; that its costs are lower than the costs of other
participants; and that the other firms have outputs of 30%, 20%, and 10%. Based on the
monopoly example in the text, the initial demand and cost schedule facing the leading firm is:
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
2,320 1,065.00 600 465.00 1,078,800
2,360 1,057.50 600 457.50 1,079,700
2,400 1,050.00* 600 450.00 1,080,000
2,440 1,042.50 600 442.50 1,079,700
2,480 1,035.00 600 435.00 1,078,800
2,520 1,027.50 600 427.50 1,077,300
2,560 1,020.50 600 420.00 1,075,200
2,600 1,012.50 600 412.50 1,072,500
* Profit-maximizing price.
If an improved warranty increases cost by $100 and demand by $150, the new situation
facing the industry leader, assuming a continued 40% market share, is:
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
2,320 1,215.00 700 515.00 1,194,800
2,360 1,207.50 700 507.50 1,197,700
2,400 1,200.00 700 500.00 1,200,000
2,440 1,192.50 700 492.50 1,201,700
2,480 1,185.00 700 485.00 1,202,800
2,520 1,177.50* 700 477.50 1,203,300
2,560 1,170.00 700 470.00 1,203,200
2,600 1,162.50 700 462.50 1,202,500
* Approximate profit-maximizing price.
At the new profit-maximizing price of $1,175 (arrived at by interpolation), output is 2,535
units (an increase of 135 units) and firm profits are $1,204,125 (an increase of $124,125). The
industry leader would adopt a profit-maximizing price and corresponding warranty because it
is in that firm's interest to do so; the other sellers must follow suit or offer an inferior combina-
tion and lose market share. Other sellers would not quote a lower price or offer a superior
warranty because, by hypothesis, they are less efficient than the industry leader. With their
higher costs, these other sellers would prefer a higher price than the one selected by the leader,
but they are constrained by the price decision of the leader; they could quote a lower price, but
only by sacrificing profits to no avail.
It is not necessary that the industry leader act as innovator in this sequence of events. The
economic reasoning does not depend on the market share of the innovating firm. Yet, only the
leading firm (assumed to be the most efficient) can compel others to follow its lead. An ineffi-
cient innovator can be undercut by a more efficient firm, and it might be reluctant to initiate
changes that could lead to intensified rivalry. Even so, the improved warranty serves the inter-
ests of all producers, and in a context of knowledgeable firms, the innovator would expect
emulation with respect to the improved warranty. For a discussion on the dynamics of oligop-
oly pricing, see F. SCHERER, SUPRA note 192 at 156-58.
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virtue of an improved warranty is perceived by any one of the three
producers, that producer will offer the warranty and make the appro-
priate price change. In a context of knowledgeable sellers and buyers,
the change will be made by the other producers as well. If they failed
to do so, they would be offering an inferior product (all things consid-
ered), and knowledgeable buyers would shun that product.
Accordingly, as long as all market participants are knowledgea-
ble, there is no reason to object to risk allocation provisions imposed
by monopolists or others possessing lesser degrees of market power.
The dominant seller has a strong incentive to develop an efficient pro-
vision, and both buyer and seller share in the resulting gain. 194
2. PROBLEMS OF IGNORANCE
There are three types of ignorance that need to be considered:
(a) buyer ignorance; (b) seller ignorance; and (c) universal ignorance
(neither party knowledgeable).
a. Buyer Ignorance
Assume, as before, that an improved warranty costs sellers $100
per unit and yields benefits of $150 per unit for buyers. If buyers are
ignorant, they might resist the new warranty because they prefer a
cost saving of $100 (or less) to a warranty with unrecognized benefits
of $150. This configuration has posed major problems in analyses of
consumer markets,195 but it is not a significant problem if buyers are
commercial enterprises.
i. Competitive Markets
If buyers and sellers operate in competitive markets, buyer igno-
rance must be massive to prevent the introduction of the improved
warranty. If one or more buyers are enlightened enough to seek an
improved warranty, the following consequences ensue (assuming the
194. For more formal proofs of the irrelevance of market power absent information
deficiencies, see Courville & Hausman, Warranty Scope and Reliability under Imperfect
Information and Alternative Market Structures, 52 J. Bus. L. 361, 370-73 (1979); M.
GEISTFELD, PERFECT INFORMATION AND OPTIMALITY: A THEORY OF CONSUMER
PRODUCT WARRANTY REVISITED 4-14; 18-19, 23-25 (Columbia Law School Center for Law
& Economic Studies Working Paper No. 29, 1987).
195. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1425-50 (1983); Spence,
Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561,
562-64 (1977); Note, Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Products Liability, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1059-60 (1988). Shavell makes this same point, but he fails to limit his
observation to consumer transactions; yet, the discussion makes clear that consumer cases are
the focus of attention. S. SHAVELL, supra note 81, at 61-62.
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improved warranty is priced at $125 per unit): Enlightened buyers
now have an advantage of $25 per unit over ignorant buyers, and
those who sell to enlightened buyers have an advantage of $25 per
unit over those who sell to ignorant buyers. This is hardly a stable
situation. Enlightened buyers will gain in their resale markets at the
expense of ignorant buyers, and those who sell to enlightened buyers
will gain at the expense of those who sell to ignorant buyers. Igno-
rance imposes penalties on buyers (as well as on those who sell to such
buyers), and such penalties are a threat to survival in competitive
markets. Ignorant buyers would be under great pressure to follow in
the footsteps of their enlightened rivals, and those who sell to such
buyers would have strong incentives to assist in their
enlightenment. ' 96
Product differentiation does not change the underlying analysis.
Buyers might be ignorant, not only of the benefits of the improved
warranty, but of other features of differentiated products in competi-
tion with one another. The burdens of buyer ignorance and the diffi-
culties of seller enlightenment are increased if multiple product
features must be compared. But in the end, buyers must meet the test
of competition in their resale markets. Buyers choosing the best prod-
uct (price, warranty, and other features considered) will succeed at
the expense of rivals making less wise choices; purchasers of inferior
products (price, warranty and other features considered) will find
themselves threatened in their resale markets. These purchasers (and
their suppliers) will be subjected to market pressures to achieve
improved price/product combinations, including improved warranty
protection when justified by a comparison of costs and benefits.
It might be argued that product development could proceed at a
pace so rapid as to preclude market evaluation and acceptance of a
superior price/product combination. Assume, as before, that an
improvement yielding benefits of $150 is priced at $125 and that igno-
rant buyers shun the new offering in the mistaken belief that the
improvement is not worth the higher price. If the improvement is
then superseded by further product developments in a relatively short
time, the interval might not be long enough to permit completion of
the process of learning and adaptation leading to the domination of
the superior price/product combination over inferior price/product
196. One perverse impact may be the attraction of poorly-situated buyers ("lemons") by
sellers making more expansive warranties. This problem of adverse selection, however,
assumes buyer knowledge. If poorly situated buyers know wherein their interests lie, better
situated buyers may be at least as well informed. Moreover, sellers can anticipate, or react to,




combinations. Anticipating such a rapid succession of products, a
producer might choose not to offer the improvement for fear that the
expected life of the product would be insufficient to permit a level of
market acceptance necessary to make the strategy of innovation a
profitable one.
This is a serious problem in the case of improvements involving
changes in the physical characteristics of the product. 197 But the con-
cern about potentially short product life is largely inapplicable to
decision-making about improved warranties applicable to particular
products. A producer incurs very little cost, and runs almost no risk,
in introducing an improved warranty. Unlike changes in the physical
characteristics of the product, which almost invariably involve a sub-
stitution of the new product for the old, the introduction of a new
warranty need not exclude the old one. The producer can offer the
old (inferior) warranty at the old price and the new (improved) war-
ranty at the appropriate price increment ($125 in the example given).
If buyers respond favorably within the effective life of the product, the
improved warranty will gain acceptance in the market. If the product
life proves too short to permit such acceptance, the producer incurs a
negligible loss (and probably realizes some gain) and buyers who
choose the improved warranty clearly derive a benefit. In sum, the
producer has everything to gain, and almost nothing to lose, in adopt-
ing improved warranties-even in dynamic markets in which the life
cycle of the product might be relatively short. For any given product,
improved warranties will be offered to buyers whenever a producer
perceives that they confer a benefit on the parties in excess of antici-
pated costs.
ii. Monopolistic Markets
If the seller is an enlightened monopolist, the result is the same-
the improved warranty will be provided. Assume, as before, that the
initial profit-maximizing price (without the improved warranty) is
$1,050. Under the assumptions previously made, the monopolist
would impose the improved warranty at a price of $1,175. (At worst,
assuming extreme inelasticity of demand, the monopolist would not
charge more than $1,200.) At any price below $1,200, the monopolist
has the power to ram the improved warranty down the throats of
unwilling buyers.' The buyers have nowhere else to go; moreover,
197. On the significance of timing in product innovations, compare Winter, Economic
"Natural Selection "and the Theory of the Firm, 4 YALE ECON. ISSUES 225, 261-67 (1964) with
Aichian, Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 43 J. POL. ECON. 211, 217-21 (1950).
198. Implicit in this observation is the assumption that those who buy from a monopolist,
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they will not be driven out of business nor constrained to buy less
product because, whatever their original ignorance, buyers will find
that the benefits of the new warranty exceed its costs (by $25 under
the assumptions previously made). As long as the monopolist is
knowledgeable, both parties will be better off under the improved
warranty; warranty responsibility will be efficiently distributed.' 99
Buyer ignorance is a problem only if the buyer is a monopolist in
the market in which it engages in resale activity 2° and the seller is not
a monopolist and cannot unilaterally impose the improved warranty
on the buyer. Because the buyer is not subject to competition in its
own sales, it cannot be compelled by market pressure to accept the
improved warranty; in fact, it might persist in refusing to do so. It
should be emphasized that it is contrary to the self-interest of the
buyer-monopolist to refuse the improved warranty and to forego the
opportunity to reduce the net costs of its operations. A reduction in
the costs of a monopolist enables it to reduce price, increase output,
and increase profits (assuming a constant demand). 2°' This is an
example of a "slothful monopolist"--one that engages in inefficient
operations but is not subject to market correction as long as its
monopoly position is maintained. Nonetheless, because it is in the
self-interest of the buyer-monopolist to accept the improved warranty,
and because sellers have an interest in achieving the same result, there
is good reason to expect that the forces of enlightenment will prevail.
having some significant investments in their businesses, will not cease operations on the
announcement of a new price/product combination, but will continue to operate as long as
revenues exceed variable costs. Accordingly, they will have an opportunity to learn of the true
costs and benefits of the improved warranty and will not thereafter cease operations.
199. There are two variations on the monopoly theme. First, the monopolist may be facing
a highly elastic demand curve. Purchasers might switch to other products rather than pay a
higher price for the monopolist's product with the improved warranty. This problem of the
"weak monopolist" is indistinguishable from the problem of product differentiation. As
previously indicated, purchasers achieving the best price/product combination will succeed at
the expense of their rivals in resale markets, putting pressure on these rivals to patronize the
"weak monopolist" and to accept the improved warranty if that is in fact the best price/
product combination available. See supra text following note 196. Only ignorance of market-
wide dimensions would preclude such an outcome.
Second, monopoly power may be exercised by several firms acting in concert. This poses
no distinctive problems. If the leading firm is knowledgeable, it will adopt and impose on its
rivals the most efficient warranty term. See supra note 193.
200. "Resale activity" is intended to encompass not only situations in which the buyer
incorporates the seller's product in the buyer's product, but also situations in which the seller's
product is used by the buyer to provide a commercial service.
201. Assume that the buyer is a profit-maximizing monopolist with an output of 6,000
units, a price of $1,050 per unit, a unit cost of $600, and a total profit of $2,700,000. See supra
Section IV(C)(1). Assuming the demand schedule there described and a cost reduction of $50




If sellers are ignorant of the advantages of offering an improved
warranty, none will do so. In competitive markets, however, this
ignorance must be massive in order to pose an impediment. Once a
competitor recognizes the advantages, it will become an innovator
and offer the improved warranty to knowledgeable buyers. To return
to the original example, the innovating seller can offer an improved
warranty for $125, providing benefits of $25 to its buyers (the war-
ranty's benefits are worth $150) and benefits of $25 to itself (the cost
of the warranty is $100). Other sellers must emulate the innovating
seller or lose market share. The process can also be triggered by the
entry of an enlightened seller or by the initiative of an enlightened
buyer, who offers a "bribe" of $125 to an ignorant seller and explains
the mutual advantages of the improved warranty. It is doubtful that
massive ignorance among sellers will persist for a prolonged period of
time in competitive markets.
Product differentiation presents no distinctive problems. Seller
ignorance, whether about one or more product features, will be penal-
ized if buyers are knowledgeable.
If the seller is a monopolist, we are confronted once again with
the problem of the "slothful monopolist"-a firm that, because of
ignorance or indifference, refuses to introduce an improved warranty
that would prove beneficial both to itself and to its customers. (Under
assumptions previously made, a monopolist could increase profits
from $2,700,000 to $3,010,075 by introducing the improved war-
ranty.) There is no simple solution to this problem except the hope of
eventual enlightenment-the monopolist awakens, an enlightened
firm enters, or the monopolist responds to the proposals of customers
(presumably, a powerful customer could insist on an improved war-
Output Price Unit Cost Unit Profit Total Profit
5800 1,065.00 550 515.00 2,987,000
5900 1,057.50 550 507.50 2,994,250
6000 1,050.00 550 500.00 3,000,000
6100 1,042.50 550 492.50 3,004,250
6200 1,035.00 550 485.00 3,007,000
6300 1,027.50* 550 477.50 3,008,250
6400 1,020.00 550 470.00 3,088,000
6500 1,012.50 550 462.50 3,006,250
* Approximate profit-maximizing price.
At the new profit-maximizing price of $1,025 (arrived at by interpolation), output is 6,337
units (an increase of 337 units), and total profits are $3,010,075 (an increase of $310,075).
Even a monopolist will profit from attaining the lowest net costs of operation. See F.
SCHERER, supra note 192, at 15-16.
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ranty).2 °2 The problem of the slothful monopolist cannot readily be
solved in any other manner. This is one of the reasons monopolies are
opposed as a matter of public policy. The important thing to recog-
nize is that this is not a problem unique to warranties; the ignorant
monopolist may produce the wrong goods, charge the wrong price,
use the wrong production techniques, or make any number of errors.
The solution is to encourage new entry and to provide competition at
the monopolist's level. One redeeming feature of this general config-
uration is that the more slothful the monopolist, the greater the
inducement to new entry. (Of course, if the monopolist is regulated,
the regulatory agency can regulate warranty matters along with any
other aspects of price and service.)
c. Universal Ignorance
If neither buyers nor sellers are knowledgeable about the advan-
tages of an improved warranty, the warranty will not be offered.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to fashion a response to this phenomenon
because it is hard to imagine that courts or legislatures will be more
enlightened about optimal warranty provisions than competitors, cus-
tomers, and prospective entrants, all of which focus their energies and
risk their fortunes in the market. 20 3  This scenario is impervious to
solution, either public or private, but it is also unlikely to occur in any
form other than as an innovation waiting to be discovered.
3. SUMMARY
Contractual allocations of risk between commercial entities are
not rendered inefficient because of disparities in bargaining power. In
202. Resistance to change may be aggravated if monopoly power is shared rather than
exercised by a single firm. If collusion is overt, there are no additional problems; once the
efficient warranty is identified, all firms would agree to adopt it in order to increase aggregate
monopoly profits and thereby increase each firm's respective share. But if the firms are
pursuing a course of tacit collusion with no explicit communications among them, it is
conceivable that an improved warranty could be withheld--even after its beneficial features are
recognized by one of the firms participating in the tacit collusion-if variation of product
features (including warranty terms) poses a threat to industry-wide adherence to a
supracompetitive price. A concern for consensus could therefore delay introduction of an
improved warranty. Nonetheless, a number of conditions must be met in order for this impact
to be felt, including disparity in the knowledge of the colluding firms and a general fear of the
breakdown of consensus pricing. In any case, the industry leader would not be deterred by
such considerations because it can impose its price/product combination on its rivals. See
supra note 193.
203. It is perhaps plausible that a specialized regulatory agency might devise a solution
more efficient than any prevailing in the market. Even this contingency seems remote, but in
any case the outcome is not troublesome. Market participants have strong incentives to adopt




this context, warranty practices are very likely to be efficient whether
they are individually negotiated between parties of equal bargaining
power or unilaterally imposed by a monopolist or other powerful
seller.
Either buyers or sellers may lack knowledge of pertinent risks,
and thus fail to appreciate the benefits of an efficient warranty
arrangement. But this is not likely to pose a problem if: (1) the
buyer's market and the seller's market are both competitive; (2) the
seller's market is monopolistic and the seller is knowledgeable; or (3)
the buyer's market and the seller's market are both monopolistic and
at least one participant is knowledgeable. Ignorance poses a problem
in only two cases: both buyers and sellers are ignorant (universal igno-
rance); or one of the market participants (either seller or buyer) is a
''slothful monopolist" and the other participant lacks market power.
The first case is unlikely to yield to any solution, either public or pri-
vate. The second is more properly viewed as a monopoly problem
rather than a warranty problem, but even here, the prospects for even-
tual enlightenment seem promising.
In sum, there are no substantial reasons-whether grounded in
concerns over market power or over the ignorance of market partici-
pants-for refusing to enforce contractual allocations of risk in sales
transactions between commercial entities. To the contrary, there is
every reason to expect that market participants will be better
informed and more highly motivated than any government agency in
efforts to identify and adopt efficient warranty terms.
D. Fraud, Concealment, and Sharp Practices
While legislatures and courts are not well suited to determine
whether particular warranty provisions are sound or unsound, it is
possible to generalize about contracting practices. Fraud, for exam-
ple, has no redeeming virtues. Resources are consumed in the crea-
tion of fraudulent schemes and in the development of measures to
protect against them. Society would be better off with no fraud at all,
and it is appropriate to react forcefully to fraud. The only restraining
influences are: (1) adjudication costs incurred in proving fraud; and
(2) possible errors in finding fraud where none exists, thereby under-
mining legitimate transactions. 2° Courts appear to adopt the appro-
priate attitude: require clear proof of fraud, but then attack fraud
with vigor.2 °5
204. See Darby & Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 67 (1973).
205. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 21 111. App. 3d 925, 316 N.E.2d 51
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Absent blatant fraud, there is still the problem of unwitting
deception or hard-to-prove fraud, the probability of which are
enhanced by buyer ignorance of contract provisions adverse to their
interests. The requirement of mandatory disclosure, along the lines,.
suggested by the UCC, is a cheap remedy, and, with modest revisions,
it could be made more efficacious. For example, the requirement of
conspicuousness should apply to every limitation of liability, whether
it takes the form of warranty disclaimer, liquidated damages, other
limitation on remedy, or other term affecting redress (such as short-
ened inspection, notice, or claim periods). In applying the UCC,
courts generally have been sensitive to such considerations, but stan-
dards could be codified with a view to reducing costs associated with
uncertainty. Even so, it is appropriate for the courts to continue to
police those merchants who are willing to sacrifice honor for profit.
Like fraud, sharp business practices have no redeeming virtues, but
policing such practices might require greater flexibility and broader
tolerance due to practical constraints.
20 6
V. THE DOMAIN OF CONTRACT: THE PROBLEM OF THE
INDIRECT BUYER
The discussion thus far has proceeded on the assumption that
only two parties are involved: a seller who deals directly with a buyer
of an end product. In fact, most of the transactions in the world of
commerce, as well as most of the litigated cases, are not so simple.
Intermediaries are involved more often than not. The most common
phenomenon is the "chain of distribution": a Ford truck, for exam-
ple, is purchased from a Ford dealer rather than from the Ford Motor
(1974) (fraudulent concealment of product defects); Oksenholt v. Lederle Laboratories, 51 Or.
App. 419, 625 P.2d 1357 (1981) (fraudulent misrepresentation as to product quality), aff'd,
294 Or. 213, 656 P.2d 293 (1982). Fraud may also provide a basis for suit under the federal
racketeering statute. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988); see, e.g., Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp.
49, 74-87 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (cause of action adequately alleged against manufacturer that
concealed defects). The RICO statute was applied to legitimate commercial entities engaging
in fraudulent activities in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989)
(telephone company gave bribes to the public utility commission for the approval of rates).
206. For example, in Industralease Automated & Scientific Equipment Corp. v. R.M.E.
Enterprise, 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977), RME leased an incinerator from
Industralease but refused to make payments when the incinerator proved to be inoperable. Id.
at 428-29. The court treated the transaction as a sale under the UCC and absolved RME of
liability. Id. at 430-32. There had been a disclaimer of warranties in the lease, but the court
held the disclaimer to be unconscionable. Id. at 432. A last-minute substitution of a revised
lease, occurring in an atmosphere of haste and pressure, had eliminated warranties appearing
in the original lease. Id. at 428. Further, it was clear that RME had relied on the expertise of
Industralease. Id. at 432.
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Company. Other cases involve the incorporation of components into
a finished product. If Ford includes a Clark transmission in a Ford
truck and the transmission proves to be defective, may the buyer sue
Clark as well as Ford? Still other cases involve purchases of used or
rehabilitated products from persons other than their initial owners. If
a product proves to be defective and the defect can be traced to the
original manufacturer, may the buyer of the used product sue the
original manufacturer?
Absent direct dealings between the parties, it is tempting to turn
to the law of torts for answers to these issues. But tort doctrine is not
the most germane body of law. The underlying issues are the same in
these "nonprivity" cases as in cases in which the parties deal directly
with one another. Contract law therefore provides the most satisfac-
tory basis for analysis. Yet, the development of an appropriate legal
framework is a complex undertaking.2 "7
A. Doing Business on the Contract-Tort Interface
If a supplier makes representations concerning its product-in
advertising, labeling, or trade literature-a remote purchaser may rely
upon those representations and seek to recover for product defects on
a theory of misrepresentation or breach of express warranty. In such
cases, the absence of privity is unlikely to protect the supplier.20 8 Sim-
ilarly, the supplier will not be permitted to rely upon limitations on
liability included in contracts between the supplier and its immediate
207. See Speidel, Warranty Theory, supra note 81, at 53-57; Note, Enforcing Manufacturers'
Warranty Exclusions Against Non-Privity Commercial Purchasers: The Need for Uniform
Guidelines, 20 GA. L. REV. 461 (1986).
208. Actions on express warranties against parties not in privity have been sustained in a
variety of cases. Fullerton Aircraft Sales & Rentals, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 842 F.2d
717 (4th Cir. 1988) (Kansas law);. Patty Precision v. Browne & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d
1260 (10th Cir. 1984) (Oklahoma law); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp.,
633 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1980) (Montana law); Blommer Chocolate Co. v. Bongards Creameries,
Inc., 635 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Illinois law); N. Feldman & Son v. Checker Motors
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Michigan law); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts Indus.,
Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (Iowa law); L.A. Green Seed Co. v. Williams, 246
Ark. 463, 438 S.W.2d 717 (1969); Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 152 Cal. App. 3d
951, 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1984); Smith v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., 237 Cal. App. 2d 766,
47 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1965) (pre-UCC case); Prairie Prod., Inc. v. Agchem Div.-Pennwalt Corp.,
514 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 218 Neb. 258,
354 N.W.2d 625 (1984); Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 298 N.C. 494, 259 S.E.2d 552 (1979);
Richard W. Cooper Agency, Inc. v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 46 N.C. App. 248, 264
S.E.2d 768 (1980); Dravo Equip. Co. v. German, 73 Or. App. 165, 698 P.2d 63 (1985); Drier v.
Perfection, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 496 (S.D. 1977); United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of
Waco, 130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W.2d 432 (pre-UCC case), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937); Ford
Motor Co. v. Lemieux Lumber Co., 418 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); cf. Flory v.
Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 574, 633 P.2d 383 (1981) (discussing possible non-UCC
express warranties). But cf. Refrigeration Sys. Co. v. Polarspan Corp., 575 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.
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purchasers (the intermediaries through which the product finds its
way into the hands of a dissatisfied plaintiff). In Randy Knitwear, Inc.
v. American Cyanamid Co. ,2 for example, American Cyanamid was
held accountable for representations of the shrink-resistant quality of
its resins; the representations accompanied the resins as they passed
through the hands of intermediaries. 1 In such circumstances, what
measures are available to protect the supplier if it seeks to limit
liability?
First, the supplier can accompany its representations with appro-
priate qualifications. Advertisements or brochures might advise that
"warranty limitations apply," further referring to the warranty state-
ment of the manufacturer. If purchasers are on notice that their
rights are qualified, there is less difficulty in holding them to limita-
tions that are spelled out in the manufacturer's warranty statement.
Second, the supplier can insist that its distributors and dealers include
the manufacturer's warranty statement, including all pertinent limita-
tions and exclusions, in their sales contracts. Properly coordinated,
these steps should permit the remote vendor to impose the same limi-
tations on ultimate purchasers as it would impose if it were dealing
with them directly. Absent such measures, there are the twin risks:
(1) that the unqualified representation will be treated as an express
warranty, not subject to disclaimer under the UCC;211 and (2) that
some purchasers will see or hear the unqualified representation and
not be apprised in a timely manner of the manufacturer's warranty
limitations.21 2 Unqualified statements may also give rise to claims
based on misrepresentation.21 3
These steps are required, not only in "chain of distribution"
cases, but also in cases in which brand name articles are included in
other products. If General Electric promotes the use of control sys-
tems employed in industrial machines manufactured by others, it can
be held accountable for misrepresentation or breach of express war-
Ohio 1983) (Wisconsin law) (requiring privity for express as well as for implied warranty
claims).
For a discussion of claims by assignees of express warranties, see Collins Co. v. Carboline
Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834 (1988) (sustaining the assignee's claim against the seller).
For related discussions from the consumer perspective, see Shapo, A Representational Theory
of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60
VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974); Whitman, Reliance as an Element in Product Misrepresentation
Suits: A Reconsideration, 35 Sw. L.J. 741 (1981).
209. 11 N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); see supra notes 158-63.
210. Id. at 12-16, 181 N.E.2d at 402-04, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 367-70.
211. See supra note 43.
212. See supra note 38.
213. See supra notes 155-83.
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ranty unless (1) the representations are qualified or (2) the manufac-
turer of the finished product includes in the contract of sale either a
separate warranty statement of GE or a statement expressly assuming
all responsibility for the finished product and expressly absolving GE.
In the absence of representations, suppliers may be liable for neg-
ligence, strict product liability, or breach of implied warranty. The
absence of privity precludes actions on implied warranties in many
states.2" 4 But an increasing number of states dispense with the
requirement of privity in most, if not all, actions on implied warran-
ties-including suits to recover damages for commercial loss. 2 5 The
214. Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1972) (Ohio law); Mount Holly
Ski Area v. U.S. Elec. Motors, 666 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (Michigan law); Eastern
Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Florida
law); Mac's Eggs, Inc. v. Rite-Way Agric. Distribs., 656 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ind. 1986)
(Indiana law); Wight v. Agristor Leasing, 652 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Kan. 1987) (Kansas law);
Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 579 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Ind. 1984) (Indiana law), aff'd, 771
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985); Refrigeration Sys. Co. v. Polarspan Corp., 575 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (Wisconsin law); N. Feldman & Son v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Michigan law); Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F.
Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1982) (Kansas law); Dudley v. Bayou Fabricators, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 788
(S.D. Ala. 1971) (Alabama law); Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 574, 633 P.2d 383
(1981); Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 152 Cal. App. 3d 951, 199 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1984); Affiliates for Evaluation & Therapy, Inc. v. Viasyn Corp., 500 So. 2d 688 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987); GAF Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); General
Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 185 S.E.2d 619 (1971); State v.
Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984); Salmon River Sportsman Camps,
Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975); Spiegel v. Sharp Elec. Corp.,
125 Ill. App. 3d 897, 466 N.E.2d 1040 (1984); Prairie Prod. Inc. v. Agchem Div.-Pennwalt
Corp., 514 N.E.2d 1299 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Dutton v. International Harvester Co., 504
N.E.2d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987); Professional Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 234
Kan. 742, 675 P.2d 887 (1984); Antel Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Sirus Leasing Co., Div. of
Sirus Enter., 101 A.D.2d 688, 475 N.Y.S.2d 944 (1984); Potsdam Welding & Mach. Co. v.
Neptune Microfloc, Inc., 57 A.D.2d 993, 394 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1977); Richard W. Cooper
Agency v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp., 46 N.C. App. 248, 264 S.E.2d 768 (1980); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Truck & Concrete Equip. Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 244,.257 N.E.2d
380 (1970); Davis v. Homasote Co., 281 Or. 383, 574 P.2d 1116 (1978); Hupp Corp. v.
Metered Washer Serv., 256 Or. 245, 472 P.2d 816 (1970); State ex rel.. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v.
Campbell, 250 Or. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); Daughtry v.
Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wash. 2d 704, 592 P.2d 631 (1979); Dimoffv. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wash.
2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d
38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976).
The North Carolina decision in Richard W. Cooper Agency has been questioned. See
Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 588 F. Supp. 1513, 1532-33 (D.D.C. 1984) (consumer case, finding
that North Carolina would probably dispense with privity).
215. The Uniform Commercial Code has been amended in 14 states to afford redress to any
injured person that the seller might reasonably have expected its goods to affect. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 4-86-101 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-318 (1973); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 490:2-318 (1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.2318 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2-318 (Supp. 1989); MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 336.2-318 (West Supp. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-318 (Supp.
1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-35 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-318 (1985); S.D.
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"economic loss" doctrine precludes liability in tort in many instances.
But the effectiveness of this bar depends on the nature of the loss sus-
tained by the remote purchaser and on the legal theory advanced in
seeking recovery: Injuries to tangible property will be redressed in
circumstances in which intangible business losses are not compen-
sated; and negligence claims are likely to succeed in some states even
if strict liability is not accepted as a basis for the recoupment of eco-
nomic losses. 216 Where a tort claim can be asserted-as it can in
many circumstances-a disclaimer or limitation of liability by the
supplier may be exceedingly difficult to enforce against a remote
purchaser.
The optimal transactional mode includes: (1) a sale by the sup-
plier to the intermediary, disclaiming warranties and otherwise limit-
ing the liability of the supplier to the extent it considers appropriate;
(2) an agreement by the intermediary to convey the supplier's limita-
tions to the ultimate purchaser, expressly naming the supplier as a
third-party beneficiary of the intermediary-purchaser contract; and
(3) inclusion of express terms limiting the supplier's liability (in war-
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-318 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-318 (1980); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (1965); Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-235 (1977). In three additional states, the
requirement of privity has been abolished in actions brought under the UCC. See MD. COM.
LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314(l)(b) (1975) (only as to the implied warranty of merchantability);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-104 (1980). Finally,
three states afford redress for natural persons that the seller might reasonably have expected its
goods to affect. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-318 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(1)
(Harrison Supp. 1989) (only as to the implied warranty of merchantability); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-318 (Law. Co-op. 1976). In the latter states, the requirement of privity has been
abolished for adversely affected proprietorships and partnerships, but not for corporations.
See Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v. Lockheed Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(Georgia law); Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978); cf JKT Co. v.
Hardwick, 274 S.C. 413, 265 S.E.2d 510 (1980) (extending the benefit of the statute to
corporate plaintiffs).
In addition, judicial initiatives in a number of states have afforded protection to adversely
affected commercial plaintiffs. See, e.g., Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105
(3d Cir. 1985) (New Jersey law); Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp., 633
F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1980) (Montana law); Held v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l Inc., 672 F. Supp.
369 (D. Minn. 1987) (Texas law); Collegiate Enters. v. Otis Elevator Co., 650 F. Supp. 116
(E.D. Mo. 1986) (Missouri law); Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919
(D.C. 1962) (pre-UCC case); Acadiana Health Club, Inc. v. Hebert, 469 So. 2d 1186 (La. Ct.
App. 1985) (non-UCC state); Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); Streich v. Hilton-Davis, Div. of Sterling Drug, Inc., 214 Mont. 44, 692 P.2d
440 (1984); Peterson v. North Am. Plant Breeders, 218 Neb. 258, 354 N.W.2d 625 (1984);
Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co., 93 Nev. 73, 560 P.2d 154 (1977); Spring Motors Distribs.,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985); Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v.
Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849 (Okla. 1979); Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217,
246 A.2d 848 (1968); Ford Motor Co. v. Lemieux Lumber Co., 418 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1967). But cf Cloer v. General Motors Corp., 395 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Tex. 1975)
(finding privity necessary under Texas law).
216. See supra notes 120-30.
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ranty, negligence, and strict liability) in the intermediary's sales con-
tract with the ultimate purchaser.21 7
These arrangements should be efficacious in component cases as
well as in "chain of distribution" cases. In the case of unbranded
components, an argument can be made that the ultimate purchaser
should be confined to claims against its immediate vendor, without
regard to the presence or absence of special agreements, because the
purchaser has no basis, ex ante, to look beyond its immediate supplier
for fulfillment of its expectations concerning all aspects of the finished
product.218 Nonetheless, in view of the complexities of modern prod-
ucts liability law, precautionary measures are advisable.
Litigation on these points is not extensive, but the cases support
the analysis adopted. In Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. ,219 Aeromexico acquired an aircraft manufactured by
McDonnell Douglas, and brought an action against McDonnell
Douglas when the landing gear failed and the aircraft was dam-
aged. 220 An exculpatory clause protected McDonnell Douglas against
a negligence claim by Aeromexico. 22' The clause was also held to
protect two suppliers who designed and manufactured the landing
gear for McDonnell Douglas.222 One of these suppliers, Menasco,
could file a third-party claim against McDonnell Douglas if Menasco
were found liable to Aeromexico; the court ruled that the allowance
of a suit against Menasco would deny McDonnell Douglas the benefit
of its bargain with Aeromexico as to risk allocation, thereby confer-
ring a windfall on Aeromexico.223 As to the other supplier, Cleveland
Pneumatic, the McDonnell Douglas sales contract provided warranty
protection under the McDonnell Douglas warranty in exchange for
the buyer's acceptance of the remote supplier's disclaimer of liabil-
217. See infra notes 219-35 & 250-58.
218. Absent representations by the component supplier, there can be no claim based on
express warranty or misrepresentation; if the parties have no contact with one another, it is
unlikely that a misrepresentation claim could be premised on a mere failure to disclose.
Moreoever, if the component supplier is not identified, neither of the implied warranty theories
are applicable. See supra notes 16-18. For reasons previously discussed, supra notes 131-53,
liability in negligence and in strict product liability should be rejected.
219. 677 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law). The details of the transaction in this
case were more complex. McDonnell Douglas Co. (MDC) sold the aircraft to McDonnell
Douglas Finance Corp. (MDFC), which assigned its rights to National Aircraft Leasing
(NAL), which in turn leased the aircraft to Aeromexico (AM). Id. at 772. The terms of the
MDC-MDFC contract, including the warranty provisions, were negotiated by MDC and AM.
Id. at 773. AM accepted an assignment of the provisions and became bound by their terms.
Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-210(4) (1987).
220. 677 F.2d at 772.
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ity.224 Accordingly, Aeromexico was barred from suing either sup-
plier. Other courts have rejected similar suits against suppliers of
components, relying on the implications of the risk allocation provi-
sions of sales contracts between manufacturers of finished products
and ultimate purchasers.225
There are, however, some cases that have reached a contrary
result. In Peterson v. North American Plant Breeders,226 for example,
Peterson purchased seed corn, produced by North American, from
one of North American's dealers.227 When the seed corn proved
defective, Peterson sued North American for breach of warranty and
was granted relief.228 In response to North American's argument that
the court's ruling would make North American an insurer of farmers'
crops, the court replied that "there is no reason that [North Ameri-
can] cannot disclaim its warranty liability by policing its dealers and
making sure that its disclaimer reaches the ultimate user of its prod-
uct during the negotiations for the product's sale."'229 Similarly, in
Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp. ,230 a dairy operator sued a manufac-
turer of milking machines for breach of implied warranty. 231  The
machines, which bore the manufacturer's brand name, were
purchased from an intermediary who had disclaimed liability.232 The
disclaimer was held not to benefit the manufacturer because it was not
sufficiently explicit;233 the court concluded that to hold otherwise
would subject the purchaser to unfair surprise.234 The court observed
that the manufacturer could protect itself by disclaiming warranties in
materials included with the goods; by joining with the retailer in the
224. Id. at 774.
225. See, e.g., King v. Hilton-Davis, 855 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1988) (Pennsylvania law), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 839 (1989); Shipco 2295, Inc. v Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925 (5th
Cir. 1987) (admiralty), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1472 (1988); S.A. Empresa v. Walter Kidde &
Co., 690 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law); Airlift Int'l, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 685 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1982) (California law); cf Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 819 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1987) (California law) (remanded for trial on
scope of exculpatory clause). For claims against component manufacturers in the absence of
exculpatory clauses, see James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (Illinois
law) (component supplier possibly subject to strict liability); States Steamship Co. v. Stone
Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500 (D.N.J. 1973) (California and Texas law)
(component supplier possibly subject to claims based on negligence and strict liability).
226. 218 Neb. 258, 354 N.W.2d 625 (1984).
227. Id. at 259-60, 354 N.W.2d at 628.
228. Id. at 270, 354 N.W.2d at 634.
229. Id. at 266, 354 N.W.2d at 632; see Hunter v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299
(8th Cir. 1986) (Arkansas law) (manufacturer protected by provision in dealer-buyer contract).
230. 639 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1981) (Texas law).
231. Id. at 1322.
232. Id. at 1321-23.
233. Id. at 1323.
234. Id. at 1324.
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latter's disclaimer on sale to the ultimate purchaser; or by being
named in the retailer's contract as a third-party beneficiary of the
warranty disclaimer.235 The Peterson and Clark cases are significant
for their emphasis on bringing home to the ultimate purchaser with
the warranty limitations of a manufacturer of a brand-name product.
A particularly troublesome case is John R. Dudley Construction,
Inc. v. Drott Manufacturing Co.236 Dudley purchased a used crane,
"as is," from Case Credit.237 Because of defective bolts, the crane
collapsed and caused extensive damage to itself but no injury to any
person or to other property.238 The court permitted Dudley to pro-
ceed against Drott, the manufacturer of the crane, in strict product
liability; the court reasoned that the crane, in its defective condition,
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to persons and property.239 The
court refused to permit Drott to rely on the "as is" provision in the
Case Credit sales transaction because there was no indication that
Drott was an intended beneficiary of that contract 24° and there was no
showing that the clause was "intended to exclude a claim of physical
damage to the product under the strict products liability theory. "241
It would be difficult to find a case more perverse than Dudley.242 By
invoking tort law, the buyer of a used product, purporting to assume
the risks of the product's deficiencies under an "as is" warranty dis-
claimer, is permitted to transfer those risks to a remote manufacturer.
Other courts have been more sympathetic to the plight of the
235. Id. Manufacturers have been protected by provisions in warranties given to ultimate
purchasers in several cases. Emmons v. Durable Mobile Homes, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 153, 154
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (manufacturer of a finished product). Boyd v. Thompson-Hayward
Chem. Co., 450 S.W.2d 937, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (manufacturer of a finished product);
see Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum Corp., 616 S.W.2d 49, 61 n.13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(manufacturer of a finished product must communicate its disclaimer to ultimate consumer).
But cf Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 26,
46 (W.D. Wash. 1980) (Washington law) (It was unclear whether the warranty limitations of a
component supplier were communicated to the ultimate purchaser, but the supplier "had no
duty to climb over [the intermediate manufacturer] on the chain of supply and hand out copies
of its contract with [the intermediary].").
236. 66 A.D.2d 368, 412 N.Y.S.2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
237. Id. at 370, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 375, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., A.T.S. Laboratories, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 59 Ohio App. 2d 15, 391
N.E.2d 1041 (1978) (manufacturer held liable to the purchaser of a used product who
purchased the product from the initial buyer). But cf. General Motors Corp. v. Halco
Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630, 635, 185 S.E.2d 619, 622 (Ct. App. 1971) (finding no
implied warranty from the original manufacturer to the subsequent purchaser of used goods);
Steckmar Nat'l Realty & Inv. Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 99 Misc. 2d 212, 215, 415 N.Y.S.2d 946,
949 (App. Sup. Ct. 1979) (reaching a result contrary to A TS on similar facts).
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manufacturer. In Datamatic, Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp. ,243 ITEL purchased used IBM computers from various sources,
assembled them into systems, and sold them under contracts dis-
claiming all warranties and assigning to its purchasers any rights
under the manufacturer's warranties.24 4 IBM's original sales con-
tracts included repair-or-replace warranties which excluded conse-
quential damages. 45 Datamatic purchased a computer system from
ITEL and, claiming a manufacturing defect, sued IBM for breach of
implied warranty, seeking a return of the purchase price, lost profits,
and other damages.246 IBM relied on its warranty limitations and
alleged that the rights of Datamatic were limited to those of the origi-
nal purchaser. 247 The court held that Datamatic was subject to IBM's
warranty limitations because Datamatic's contract with ITEL indi-
cated that "there might be limited manufacturer's warranties.
248
More broadly, the court ruled that Datamatic
acquired only the limited warranties possessed by its predecessors
in title when it signed the purchase agreement with ITEL .... To
allow Datamatic to pursue unlimited rights against IBM would
render limited warranties almost meaningless to a manufacturer
.... Subsequent purchasers... should bear the responsibility of
checking what rights they are acquiring against the manufacturer
rather than requiring manufacturers to track down all subsequent
purchasers of their products.249
The outcome was adverse to the manufacturer in Patty Precision
Products Co. v. Browne & Sharpe Manufacturing Co. ,25o but a concur-
243. 613 F. Supp. 715 (W.D. La. 1985) (Louisiana law), aff'd, 795 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1986).
244. Id. at 716-17, 720.
245. Id. at 716-17.
246. Id. at 717.
247. Id. at 716.
248. Id. at 721 n.14.
249. Id. at 721-22; accord Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 285
(W.D. Va. 1986) (Michigan law) (limitation on liability effective against assignee of partial
interest in purchased equipment), rev'd on other grounds, 832 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1987); Unifoil
Corp. v. Cheque Printers & Encoders Ltd., 622 F. Supp. 268 (D.N.J. 1985) (New Jersey law)
(remote purchaser limited to rights of immediate purchaser of component); R & L Grain Co.
v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (same); Wenner Petroleum Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 748 P.2d 356 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (remote purchaser of specialized industrial
product limited to rights of immediate purchaser); Western Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron
Works, 605 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980) (same); cf W.J. Rapp Co. v. Whitlock Equip. Corp., 222
Va. 80, 279 S.E.2d 133 (1981) (remote purchaser cannot proceed under UCC against supplier
of component). A remote purchaser may obtain greater rights, however, as a result of direct
contacts with the manufacturer. See Wood Prods. Inc. v. CMI Corp., 651 F. Supp. 641, 651
(D. Md. 1986) (Maryland law) (otherwise accepting the approach ofDatamatic); Abco Metals
Corp. v. J.W. Imports Co., 560 F. Supp. 125, 128 (N.D. I1. 1982) (Illinois law) (direct contacts
sufficed to avoid absence of privity), aff'd, 721 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1983).
250. 846 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1988) (Oklahoma law).
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ring opinion made a meaningful contribution to the dialogue. Patty
Precision purchased machines from Browne & Sharpe,25" ' a manufac-
turer which had incorporated in its machines a component originating
with General Electric. 2 The component had been purchased from
GE subject to a limited warranty.253 Patty Precision sued Browne &
Sharpe, GE, and others for breach of implied warranty.254 The court
refused to permit GE to rely on the warranty limitations in its con-
tract of sale to Browne & Sharpe on the ground that these limitations
had never been communicated to Patty Precision. 255 A concurring
opinion found that GE was estopped from relying on the warranty
limitations because, in its direct dealing with Patty Precision (repair-
ing the component), GE had never disclosed the limitations.25 6 None-
theless, the concurrence made these points: (1) when "the first buyer
adds, assembles or incorporates the manufacturer's product into
another item or when the first buyer modifies or uses the manufac-
turer's product before resale," limitations of liability and disclaimers
of warranty are binding on subsequent buyers; and (2) when the inter-
mediary is a dealer, any disclaimers or limitations must be communi-
cated to the ultimate consumer.257 The basis for the distinction is that
the "typical component part manufacturer will be selling to a larger
entity which it cannot reasonably be expected to control. In contrast,
the problem of notice is less severe [with distributors]; the manufac-
turer frequently can notify the ultimate purchaser simply by affixing a
copy of the disclaimer to the product.
258
B. A Proposed Resolution
There is substantial disarray in warranty law, complicated by the
economic loss problem in tort law, concerning the status of the non-
privity buyer. In both instances, the impetus for restricting liability
appears to be the courts' concern with subjecting the manufacturer to
liability that is both excessive in scope and difficult to bound by con-
tract or other means. The judicial responses to date, while generally
consistent with the analysis of the preceding Section, have nonetheless
251. Id. at 1248.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1248-49.
254. Id. at 1248.
255. Id. at 1252-54.
256. Id. at 1256 (Logan, J., concurring). The concurrence found that GE's direct dealings
with Patty Precision, without disclosure of the warranty limitations, induced Patty Precision
to rely on GE's warranties. Id. at 1258. The estoppel argument, however, did not disclose any
detriment to Patty Precision as a result of the asserted reliance. Id. at 1258.
257. Id. at 1257.
258. Id.
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been erratic and lacking in consistent doctrinal orientation. The reso-
lution proposed here to alleviate these problems has three elements:
(1) abolition of tort liability in commercial sales transactions; (2) abo-
lition of privity as a requirement in warranty actions; and (3) creation
of different (and more restricted) limitations on actions against remote
vendors.
As previously noted,259 tort liability is a redundant and unneces-
sary complication in commercial sales transactions. The efficiency of
warranty limitations, developed in detail in Section IV, is not affected
by whether the purchaser is an immediate or remote vendee. War-
ranty limitations are more likely to be given effect under a regime of
contract than under a regime of tort.
The requirement of privity in warranty claims has been substan-
tially eroded, and the trend appears to be continuing.26° The twilight
existence of privity is a trap for the unwary and an invitation to con-
tinuing litigation and piecemeal legislative reform-all of which make
the UCC a less than uniform statute.
With tort liability and privity thus vanquished, the policy issues
may be addressed directly. At this juncture, it is necessary to distin-
guish between two classes of nonprivity cases: (1) cases in which the
distribution of products is achieved through middlemen; and (2) cases
in which products are assembled from components, or used products
are rehabilitated or resold.
1. CHANNELS OF DISTRIBUTION
If a product passes from the manufacturer, through middlemen,
and into the hands of the ultimate user, the manufacturer should have
the same responsibility to the user as if it had sold the product
directly. All warranties, express or implied, should be enforceable by
the user against the manufacturer. The justifications are the same as
in the privity case: enforcing conformity with general commercial
expectations and forcing the manufacturer to make more efficient
arrangements if they are appropriate. The problem is that the manu-
facturer may experience greater difficulty in making effective realloca-
tions of risk in the case of the non-privity buyer. The following are
suggested solutions.
First, all advertisements, brochures, or packaging should contain
a prominent statement that the manufacturer's warranties are subject
to limitations expressed in the manufacturer's warranty statement.
259. See supra notes 131-53 & 182-83.
260. See supra notes 208 & 214-15; see also 1 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 26, at
528-30, 534-41; Speidel, Warranty Theory, supra note 81, at 26-27, 33-37, 42-43.
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While express warranties cannot be contradicted by disclaimers, they
can be negated by other statements;26 moreover, remedies may be
limited in the case of both express and implied warranties.262
Second, all dealers authorized to handle the manufacturer's
product should be required to distribute the manufacturer's warranty
statement at or before the time of sale to the ultimate user. In addi-
tion, each dealer can be required to execute an indemnification agree-
ment that holds the manufacturer harmless if the manufacturer is
exposed to warranty liability as a result of the dealer's failure to make
a timely and adequate distribution of the manufacturer's warranty
statement.
If these conditions are met, all purchasers should be deemed to
have been apprised, as a matter of law, that warranty statements do
exist and are available through authorized channels of distribution.
These are commercial purchasers, and they should not be allowed to
circumvent the manufacturer's carefully implemented warranty pol-
icy by purchasing products from unauthorized dealers in close-outs,
liquidations, or the like.
In sum, privity would be abolished both for offensive and defen-
sive purposes. No manufacturer in a "chain of distribution" case
should be allowed to escape warranty responsibility by arguing a lack
of privity; but neither should any purchaser be permitted to escape
the manufacturer's warranty statement by pleading ignorance if: (1)
all express warranties (advertisements, brochures, and the like) advise
that such a statement exists; and (2) all authorized distributors make
the statement available at or before the time of sale. Most of these
proposals can be effectuated under existing UCC provisions. The only
needed supplementation is a provision that a buyer will be deemed to
know that warranty limitations exist if the limitations are referred to
in all advertising material of the manufacturer and are distributed by
the manufacturer's authorized dealers. The proposed change is
unlikely to conflict with expectations in the commercial sector, and
lack of buyer knowledge under the circumstances described should be
treated as willful ignorance.
2. COMPONENTS AND USED PRODUCTS
When a manufacturer sells a newly finished product to a user,
whether directly or through intermediaries, it is reasonable to impose
warranty obligations in accordance with the terms of the preceding
Section. It would be inordinately wasteful, however, to impose such
261. See supra note 44.
262. See supra notes 32-37.
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requirements on the manufacturers of components, and it would be
wholly impracticable to impose such requirements on the manufac-
turers of original equipment that was subsequently rehabilitated or
resold after use by the initial purchaser. In such cases, the general
rule should be that no warranties are implied and that express war-
ranties must run directly to the user. Some examples may be helpful.
Example 1. A supplier provides components to a manufacturer of a
finished product, the supplier engages in no advertising in connection
with this finished product, and the supplier's brand name is not prom-
inently displayed on the finished product. The purchaser of the fin-
ished product, proximate or remote, must look to the manufacturer of
the finished product for warranty protection in accordance with the
warranty statement of that manufacturer. The supplier of the compo-
nents should not be liable, in warranty or in tort, for unrealized expec-
tations or property damage. Under these circumstances, the
purchaser has no basis for looking beyond its immediate vendor: the
only losses are commercial in nature, and the remote supplier has
made no commitments, express or implied, to the ultimate purchaser.
Example 2. A supplier provides a component to the manufacturer of
a finished product and engages in advertising with respect to either
that component or the finished product, or its brand name is promi-
nently displayed on the finished product. This provides a basis for a
warranty, express or implied, running from the supplier of the compo-
nent to the ultimate user. Liability under this warranty could none-
theless be limited in either of two ways. The component supplier
could be named in the warranty statement of the manufacturer,
thereby obtaining protection similar to that of the manufacturer as a
third-party beneficiary of the manufacturer-user contract. For exam-
ple, an exclusion of consequential damages could expressly apply to
suppliers of components as well as to the selling manufacturer. Alter-
natively, the component supplier could issue a separate warranty
statement to the ultimate user and enter into either direct contractual
relations or indirect relations through dealers. The purchaser could
then pursue the component supplier for breach of warranty, but such
action would be subject to the limitations in the component supplier's
warranty statement.
Example 3. A seller of rehabilitated goods, or of assembled goods
consisting of components that were not supplied directly by their
manufacturers, would be subject to warranty liability to ultimate
users in accordance with the UCC. But manufacturers of the original
products would be immune except to the extent that they expressly
warranted their components by separate representations related to the
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rehabilitated or assembled product. For example, a manufacturer of a
hydraulic brake system could warrant the performance of that system
in a rebuilt truck incorporating the system, but it would have to do so
expressly in relation to the rebuilt truck. There would be no implied
warranties, and express warranties directed to other applications
(such as direct sales of the brake system to others) would not apply to
the rebuilt truck.
Example 4. Finally, the buyer of a used product may obtain war-
ranty rights by assignment from the initial purchaser. In the absence
of a restriction in the warranty itself, warranty rights are assigna-
ble. 263 However, the subsequent purchaser (or assignee) takes subject
to all limitations applicable to the original purchaser (or assignor).2 "
The obligations of the manufacturer are not enlarged by assignment.
These proposals are generally in accord with existing law, but
clarification would be useful. The most troublesome situation
involves the assembler of new goods, not specifically authorized by
manufacturers of components. Here, as in the case of unauthorized
dealers, purchasers should be deemed to know that component manu-
facturers do not warrant their products unless they do so explicitly.
This is probably in accord with commercial expectations; if not, the
deviation suggested by the proposal is not a dramatic one and it is
necessary in order to prevent uncontrolled extensions of warranty
liability.
3. DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
The abrogation of tort liability in this context may leave some
uneasy about assuring responsibility for product safety. On this, sev-
eral points deserve emphasis.
First, these proposals are confined to property damage and other
commercial loss. Liability for personal injuries is unaffected. Second,
these proposals are confined to commercial participants. Warranties
263. See Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 532 N.E.2d 834 (1988) (collecting
modem cases); Annotation, 17 A.L.R.2d 1196 (1951) (collecting older cases). Contra Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (Georgia
law). Carboline and related cases are concerned with explicit assignments of express
warranties and rely on Section 2-210(2) of the UCC. There is no bar to applying the logic of
these decisions, and the terms of Section 2-210(2), to implicit assignments of implied
warranties of merchantability. Cf Aronsohn v. Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 484 A.2d 675 (1984)
(implied warranty of good workmanship, in a construction contract, assigned by implication to
a subsequent owner of the premises); Gupta v. Ritter Homes, 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1983)
(implied warranty of habitability and good workmanship, in a construction contract, assigned
as a matter of law to a subsequent owner of the premises).
264. See Datamatic, Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F. Supp. 715 (W.D.
La. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1986); see also cases cited supra note 249.
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involving ordinary consumers are not addressed. Third, these propos-
als apply only to purchasers of products; they do not bind third par-
ties. If, for example, a farmer purchased a pesticide and assumed the
risk of crop damage, that farmer could not sue for crop loss if the
pesticide proved to be harmful. A neighboring farmer, however,
could sue the manufacturer if his crop was contaminated by the pesti-
cide purchased and used by the first farmer.265 Finally, someone will
be responsible for product safety (usually the manufacturer of the fin-
ished product); in the absence of a valid limitation, that responsibility
extends to all property losses.
In sum, the proposed resolution provides a means of allocating
risks between buyers and sellers, largely without regard to privity, but
the allocation does not provide immunity for unsafe products or an
incentive to produce unsafe products.
VI. PERSONAL INJURIES IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMERCIAL
SALES TRANSACTIONS
For the most part, this Article has avoided issues dealing with
liability for personal injuries. There are a few instances, however, in
which personal injury claims may emerge in a commercial context.
First, it is clear that if a product causes personal injury, the typi-
cal victim-whether consumer, employee, or bystander-can bring
suit against the manufacturer and recover, in actions based on negli-
gence, strict liability or misrepresentation, if the standards of the per-
tinent tort theory have been satisfied. Such cases are not affected by
any of the proposals made in this Article. The victims are not fore-
closed by contractual provisions allocating risks between the manu-
facturer and its purchaser because the victims are not parties to the
manufacturer-purchaser contract.266
Second, the manufacturer and its purchaser may nonetheless
allocate ultimate responsibility for personal injuries by contracts of
indemnity. In one case, for example, a railroad sold a bridge to a
commercial buyer, who agreed to indemnify the railroad for any dam-
ages relating to the removal of the bridge, including damages resulting
from railroad negligence.267 In an accident connected with the
265. E.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); accord
Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965) (personal injury sustained by
buyer's employee); Ferragamo v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 395 Mass. 581, 481
N.E.2d 477 (1985) (same); Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d
750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1973) (same).
266. See supra note 265.
267. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Nielsen, 448 F.2d 121, 122 (10th Cir. 1971); accord
Beloit Power Sys. v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 757 F.2d 1427 (3d Cir. 1985) (awarding seller
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removal of the bridge, a railroad employee was killed;268 his adminis-
tratrix later recovered damages from the railroad premised on the
railroad's negligence.26 9 The railroad obtained reimbursement from
the buyer of the bridge under the indemnity provision of the contract
of sale.27°
The sole remaining point is a troublesome one, an issue on which
pertinent authority is surprisingly sparse. Suppose, for example, that
the buyer is not a corporation but a natural person such as a sole
proprietor. May the buyer assume the risk of personal injury to him-
self, notwithstanding breaches of warranty or tortious misconduct on
the part of the seller? In Turner v. International Harvester Co. ,271 the
buyer of a tractor-a sole proprietor-was killed when the cab col-
lapsed on top of him while he was working on the engine.272 The
buyer's widow sued for breach of warranty and also alleged negli-
gence and strict product liability. 273 The seller relied on the fact that
the tractor was a used one which had been sold "as is."'274 The court
held that the disclaimer was effective to defeat the widow's warranty
claim, but not sufficiently explicit to preclude jury consideration of
whether the buyer had unequivocally waived the seller's responsibility
for any safety defects. 275 A similar case involved the lessee of a gaso-
line service station, injured as a result of the negligence of his oil com-
pany landlord.276 In striking down an allocation of the risk of injury
to the lessee-operator, the court relied heavily on procedural uncon-
scionability-the failure of the oil company to bring the contract pro-
vision to the attention of the service station operator.277
indemnification from its buyer on a personal injury claim premised on the seller's negligence
and strict liability); Orville Milk Co. v. Beller, 486 N.E.2d 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (same); cf.
University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1973) (holding general
language of tenant's agreement to indemnify landlord against any and all claims insufficient to
indemnify landlord for his own negligence); Maxon Corp. v. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 497
N.E.2d 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (denying indemnification because of the insufficiency of
evidence of an agreement).
268. Southern Pacific, 448 F.2d at 123.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 124-25.
271. 133 N.J. Super. 277, 336 A.2d 62 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975). An implied warranty
claim was set for trial, notwithstanding a disclaimer, in Ferens v. Deere & Co., 639 F. Supp.
1484 (W.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), vacatedon other grounds, 108 S. Ct.
2862 (1988). In Ferens, a farmer-purchaser lost his hand while cleaning a combine. Id. at
1485. In an action against the manufacturer for breach of warranty, the court held that a
triable issue existed as to whethZr the disclaimer provision was unconscionable. Id. at 1489.
272. 133 N.J. Super. at 283, 336 A.2d at 66.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 284, 336 A.2d at 66.
275. Id. at 284-85, 296, 336 A.2d at 66-67, 73.
276. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
277. Id. at 464-65, 276 N.E.2d at 148.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Both cases are ambivalent on the legality of risk allocation in a
context of complete disclosure. The pertinent UCC provision on con-
tractual modification of remedies is also unhelpful. It provides:
"Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation
of damages where the loss is commercial is not. '2 78 Nothing is said,
one way or the other, about a sole proprietor sustaining personal inju-
ries as a result of a defective nonconsumer product (such as a
machine, lumber used for scaffolding, or industrial chemicals).
In the context of injuries to sole proprietors, a rule barring excul-
patory clauses may assist in resolving uncertainties. Manufacturers of
products can obtain insurance against personal injury claims stem-
ming from product defects.2 79 Moreover, they can shift the risks of
personal injury to the buyer if the buyer is an artificial entity. If the
logic of risk allocation suggests that the buyer, rather than the seller,
should bear the risk of personal injuries, the seller can insist on the
following: (1) that the buyer incorporate; (2) that the buying corpora-
tion insure against personal injury claims; and (3) that the buying cor-
poration agree to indemnify the seller for any personal injuries caused
by the purchased product, including those sustained by the buyer in
his individual capacity. Under this arrangement, the buying corpora-
tion would obtain the requisite liability insurance and would assume
ultimate responsibility for all personal injury claims (including a
claim by the buyer in his individual capacity).,80
In sum, under the limited circumstances specified, claims for per-
sonal injuries can be accommodated within the general structure of
risk allocation discussed in this Article. As long as both parties to the
sales transaction are commercial entities, the transaction can be struc-
tured so as to place responsibility for the risk of personal injury on the
party that is in the best position to assume that risk at the lowest
cost. 
281
278. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1987).
279. See 2 R. LONG, supra note 187, 11-1 to 11-9; W. RODDA, PROPERTY AND LIABILITY
INSURANCE 394-96 (1966).
280. Of course, there are many transactions in which this mode of reallocating risks would
be impracticable-for example, the sale of automobiles and pickup trucks to small
entrepreneurs. These are cases, however, in which the buyers are likely to be indistinguishable,
for all practical purposes, from ordinary consumers. Under the approach here proposed, all
such buyers would be protected under normal product liability rules in the event of personal
injury.
281. This Article does not address the broader question of whether products liability law is
an appropriate means of providing insurance against personal injury. For recent criticisms of
this "insurance" approach, see Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 645 (1985); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987); Schwartz, Proposals for Product Liability Reform: A Theoretical
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VII. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR CONTRACT
When parties are strangers to one another, there is no alternative
to the law of torts. A motorist might prefer to enter a contract with
other motorists, agreeing that each party shall carry his or her own
insurance and not seek compensation from others. Such contracts,
however, are impracticable. Accordingly, courts are compelled to
adopt general rules to govern liability for automobile accidents-rules
that may or may not be efficient in the general run of cases, but that
are almost certainly inefficient in a significant subset of cases (such as
where both parties, ex ante, would have preferred to rely on first-
party insurance). When contract is available as an alternative, it is
possible for parties to reach efficient solutions appropriate to their
particular circumstances.
But the availability of contract is not enough. This Article does
not attempt to address disclaimers of product liability in consumer
cases. Suffice it to say that because of limitations on consumer knowl-
edge and because of disparities in consumer wealth, it cannot be said
that contractual reallocations of risk are economically efficient and
socially acceptable in the general run of manufacturer-consumer
transactions.282
These limitations, however, do not apply to commercial transac-
tions. As discussed in Section IV, the efficiency of contractual alloca-
tions of risk in the commercial context does not depend to any
significant extent on the competitive condition of markets or on the
market participants' knowledge of risks (although knowledge of con-
tract terms is significant). Similarly, wealth is not a significant varia-
ble. The impact of risk reallocations on the wealth of business firms is
indistinguishable from any other contract provision-including
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353 (1988). The discussion in this Section is intended to show the
relationship between personal injury liability and the allocation of risks between commercial
parties, and to show the practicability of bringing injury to the person of an entrepreneur
within the general risk allocation structure if the parties desire to do so.
In some states, a sole proprietor can elect coverage under workers' compensation statutes.
See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 54(8) (McKinney 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 102.075
(1988). Such an election would ameliorate the problem of personal injury to the proprietor.
282. For a discussion of the limitations on consumer knowledge, see authorities cited supra
note 195. For a discussion of the problems associated with consumer wealth, see Jones, Private
Revision of Public Standards: Exculpatory Agreements in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 717, 746-
48 (1988); Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 770-74 (1983).
If, for example, first-party insurance were to be substituted for products liability as a means of
compensation for product-related accidents, some consideration would have to be given to the
affordability of first-party insurance for less affluent members of society-as compared with the
implicit insurance provided with purchased products (and reflected in a product's price).
Wealth disparities may not prove to be an insuperable obstacle, but they are a factor that must
be considered in cases involving compensation for consumers.
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price-that distributes benefits and burdens among the parties to
commercial contracts. If price is not controlled, intervention with
respect to any other contract term is likely to produce inefficient
arrangements with adverse effects upon one or both parties. The
weaker party is not advantaged by requiring the stronger party to pur-
sue inefficient arrangements for which a higher price will be
charged.283
The role of tort law in commercial product liability cases is
redundant and perverse. It is used by litigants and courts to under-
mine allocations of risks agreed to by the parties and to substitute
judicial solutions for contractual arrangements that are almost cer-
tainly superior in terms of both fairness and efficiency. Substantial
gains can be achieved by excluding tort liability from business dis-
putes concerning the allocation of commercial losses.
283. This point is developed in further detail in Jones, supra note 282, at 737-38, 749-50.
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VIII. APPENDIX: THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE IN
COMMERCIAL SALES TRANSACTIONS
1. Absent an accident-like injury to the product itself, or to the
person or other property of the buyer, the overwhelming majority of
courts deny recovery, in negligence and in strict liability, to the buyer
of a defective product:
Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 830
F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1987) (Wisconsin law) (negligence and strict lia-
bility); Shipco 2295, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 825 F.2d 925
(5th Cir. 1987) (admiralty) (negligence and strict liability), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988); Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor,
Inc., 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wisconsin law) (negligence and
strict liability); Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 771 F.2d 1081 (7th
Cir. 1985) (Indiana law) (negligence); American Home Assurance Co.
v. Major Tool & Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1985) (Minne-
sota law) (negligence and strict liability); Henry Heide, Inc. v. WRH
Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1985) (New Jersey law) (negligence
and strict liability); Colonial Park Country Club v. Joan of Arc, 746
F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1984) (New Mexico law) (strict liability); R.W.
Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983)
(Missouri law) (negligence); Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d
942 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (Georgia law) (negligence); Purvis v. Consoli-
dated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982) (South Caro-
lina law) (strict liability); Mercer v. Long Mfg. N.C., Inc., 665 F.2d
61 (5th Cir. 1982) (Texas law) (strict liability); Pittway Corp. v. Lock-
heed Aircraft Corp., 641 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1981) (Illinois law) (strict
liability); Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (Illinois law) (negligence and strict liabil-
ity); Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., Div. of Searle Agric.
Inc., 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980) (Texas law) (strict liability), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1980) (California law) (neg-
ligence and strict liability);
Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425
(9th Cir. 1979) (California law) (strict liability); S.M. Wilson & Co. v.
Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978) (California law) (neg-
ligence); Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Pennsylvania law) (strict liability); Southwest Forest
Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.)
(Pennsylvania law) (strict liability), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1970);
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Sundstrand Corp., 681 F. Supp. 287 (W.D. Pa.
1988) (California, Illinois, and North Carolina law) (negligence); Frey
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Dairy v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 680 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.
Mich. 1988) (Michigan law) (negligence and strict liability); Klo-Zik
Co. v. General Motors Corp., 677 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Texas 1987)
(Texas law) (strict liability); Richard O'Brien Cos. v. Challenge-Cook
Bros., 672 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1987) (Colorado law) (negligence
and strict liability); Mt. Holly Ski Area v. U.S. Elec. Motors, Div. of
Emerson Elec. Co., 666 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (Michigan
law) (negligence); Mac's Eggs, Inc. v. Rite-Way Agri Distribs., Inc.,
656 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (Indiana law) (strict liability); Cin-
cinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) (Ohio law) (negligence and strict liability); McConnell v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 646 F. Supp. 1520 (D.N.J. 1986) (admiralty)
(negligence and strict liability); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Trans-
america Delaval, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York
law) (negligence and strict liability); Agristor Leasing v. Kramer, 640
F. Supp. 187 (D. Minn. 1986) (Minnesota law) (negligence and strict
liability);
Consumers Power Co. v. Mississippi Valley Structural Steel Co., 636
F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (Michigan law) (negligence and
strict liability); In re James Noel Flying Serv., Inc., 61 Bankr. 335
(W.D. La. 1986) (Louisiana law) (strict liability); Agristor Leasing v.
Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Kan. 1986) (Kansas law) (negligence
and strict liability); Sylla v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 1044
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (Michigan law) (negligence and strict liability);
Sylla v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., 595 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(Michigan law) (negligence and strict liability); Hart Eng'g Co. v.
FMC Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1471 (D.R.I. 1984) (Michigan, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island law) (negligence and strict liability);
Eaton Corp. v. Magnavox Co., 581 F. Supp. 1514 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(Michigan law) (negligence and strict liability); Hammermill Paper
Co. v. Pipe Sys., 581 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (Texas law)
(strict liability); City of Clayton v. Grumman Emergency Prods., Inc.,
576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (Missouri law) (negligence and
strict liability); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
567 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (New York law) (negligence and
strict liability); Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F.
Supp. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Maryland law) (negligence); County of
Westchester v. General Motors Corp., 555 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (New York law) (negligence and strict liability); General Pub.
Utils. Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (Pennsylvania law) (strict liability); Anglo Eastern Bulkships
Ltd. v. Ameron, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (admiralty)
(strict liability); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp.,
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546 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1982) (Kansas law) (negligence); Office
Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Wis. 1982)
(California law) (negligence); Argo Welded Prods., Inc. v. J.T. Ryer-
son Steel & Sons, 528 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (New Jersey and
Pennsylvania law) (negligence); Baltimore Football Club, Inc. v.
Lockheed Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (Georgia law)
(negligence and strict liability); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 519 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (Georgia law)
(negligence); Polycon Indus., Inc. v. Hercules Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316
(E.D. Wis. 1979) (Michigan law) (strict liability);
Sioux City Community School Dist. v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978) (Iowa law) (strict liability);
Plainwell Paper Co. v. Pram, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1386 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(Pennsylvania law) (strict liability); Midland Forge, Inc. v. Letts
Indus., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (Iowa law) (strict
liability); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962 (D.
Ariz. 1975) (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Texas law)
(negligence and strict liability), aff'd per curiam, 541 F.2d 226 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Cooley v. Salopian
Indus., Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1114 (D.S.C. 1974) (South Carolina law)
(strict liability); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 360 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (Iowa law) (strict liabil-
ity); Noel Transfer & Package Delivery Serv., Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., 341 F. Supp. 968 (D. Minn. 1972) (Minnesota law) (strict lia-
bility); Karl's Shoe Stores, Ltd. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F.
Supp. 376 (D. Mass. 1956) (Massachusetts law) (negligence); Dono-
van Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn.
1955) (Minnesota law) (negligence); State ex rel Smith v. Tyonek
Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d 1148 (Alaska 1984) (negligence); Northern
Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324
(Alaska 1981) (negligence and strict liability); Beauchamp v. Wilson,
21 Ariz. App. 14, 515 P.2d 41 (1973) (strict liability); Berkeley Pump
Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279 Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983)
(strict liability); Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman
Flexible, 158 Cal. App. 3d 289, 204 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1984) (negligence
and strict liability); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
55 Cal. App. 3d 737, 127 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Ct. App. 1976) (strict liabil-
ity); Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 442, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 113 (1972) (negligence and strict liability); Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987)
(negligence); Affiliates for Evaluation & Therapy, Inc. v. Viasyn
Corp., 500 So. 2d 688 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (negligence); GAF
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Corp. v. Zack Co., 445 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (negligence
and strict liability), review denied, 453 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1984);
Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp. v. European X-Ray Distribs., 444
So. 2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (strict liability); Monsanto
Agric. Prods. Co. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (negligence); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699
P.2d 1349 (1984) (negligence and strict liability); Adkinson Corp. v.
American Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984) (negligence
and strict liability); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho
326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978) (negligence); Myers v. A.O. Smith Harves-
tore Prods., Inc., 114 Idaho 432, 757 P.2d 695 (Ct. App. 1988) (negli-
gence and strict liability); Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection
Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246 (1986) (negligence); Moorman
Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982)
(negligence and strict liability); Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice
Foods Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041 (1980) (negligence);
Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364
N.E.2d 100 (1977) (negligence); Dutton v. International Harvester
Co., 504 N.E.2d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (strict liability); Bay State-
Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 404 Mass.
103, 533 N.E.2d 1350 (1989) (negligence and strict liability); Marcil v.
John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 625, 403 N.E.2d 430
(1980) (negligence); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty's, Inc., 154 Mich.
App. 634, 397 N.W.2d 853 (1986) (negligence), appeal denied, 428
Mich. 874 (1987); A.C. Hoyle Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 128 Mich.
App. 557, 340 N.W.2d 326 (1983) (negligence); McGhee v. GMC
Truck & Coach Div., 98 Mich. App. 495, 296 N.W.2d 286 (1980)
(negligence and strict liability); Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay
Bros., 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987) (negligence); S.J. Groves & Sons
v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp., 374 N.W.2d 431 (Minn. 1985) (neg-
ligence and strict liability); Minneapolis Soc'y of Fine Arts v. Parker-
Klein Assocs. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984) (negli-
gence and strict liability); Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp Corp.,
311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981) (negligence and strict liability); Hol-
stad v. Southwestern Porcelain, Inc., 421 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1988) (negligence and strict liability);
Tri-State Ins. Co. v. Lindsay Bros., 364 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985) (negligence and strict liability); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Steeple Jac, Inc., 352 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (negli-
gence and strict liability); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (strict
liability); Forrest v. Chrysler Corp., 632 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (strict liability); Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harves-
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tore Prods., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (negligence
and strict liability); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213
Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983) (negligence and strict liability); Cen-
tral Bit Supply Inc. v. Waldrop Drilling & Pump, Inc., 102 Nev. 139,
717 P.2d 35 (1986) (negligence and strict liability); Spring Motors
Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985)
(negligence and strict liability); Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Elgood
Mayo Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 667, 436 N.E.2d 1322, 451 N.Y.S.2d 720
(1982) (strict liability); Utica Observer Dispatch, Inc. v. Booth, 106
A.D.2d 863, 483 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1984) (negligence); Mid-Hudson
Mack, Inc. v. Dutchess Quarry & Supply Co., 99 A.D.2d 751, 471
N.Y.S.2d 664 (1984) (negligence and strict liability); Cayuga Har-
vester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1983) (negligence and strict liability); Steckmar Nat'l Realty & Inv.
Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 99 Misc. 2d 212, 415 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct.
1979) (negligence and strict liability); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 1 Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct.
1955) (negligence); Hagert v. Hatton Commodities, Inc., 350 N.W.2d
591 (N.D. 1984) (strict liability); Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624 (1989)
(negligence and strict liability); Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583 (1974) (strict liability); Brown
v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 521 P.2d 537 (1974) (strict
liability); REM Coal Co. v: Clark Equip. Co., 1563 A.2d 128 (Pa.
Super. 1989) (negligence and strict liability); Carolina Winds Owners'
Ass'n v. Joe Hardin Builder, Inc., 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct.
App. 1988) (favorable comment on economic loss doctrine in context
of construction case involving negligence); Mid Continent Aircraft
Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.
1978) (strict liability); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. Talley, 493
S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (strict liability); Sensenbrenner v.
Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55
(1988) (favorable comment on economic loss doctrine in context of
construction case involving negligence); Sunnyscope Grading Inc. v.
Miller, Bradford & Risberg, 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989).
2. There is some authority to the contrary, particularly in cases
asserting negligence:
N. Feldman & Son v. Checker Motors Corp., 572 F. Supp. 310
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Michigan law) (negligence and strict liability); R &
L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(Wisconsin law) (negligence and strict liability); Feeders, Inc. v. Mon-
santo Co., No. Civ. 4-77-306 (D. Minn. May 15, 1981) (LEXIS,
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Genfed library, Dist file) (Minnesota law) (negligence); Mead Corp. v.
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio
law) (strict liability); Continental Oil Co. v. General Am. Transp.
Corp., 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (Ohio law) (negligence and
strict liability); Berkeley Pump Co. v. Reed-Joseph Land Co., 279
Ark. 384, 653 S.W.2d 128 (1983) (negligence); Pisano v. American
Leasing, 146 Cal. App. 3d 194, 194 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1983) (negligence);
Webb v. Dessert Seed Co., 718 P.2d 1057 (Colo. 1986) (negligence);
Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 366 Mass. 154, 315
N.E.2d 885 (1974) (negligence); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (negli-
gence); Lang v. General Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805 (N.D. 1965)
(negligence); State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 250 Or.
262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968) (negligence), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093
(1969); W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah
1981) (negligence); Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584,
555 P.2d 818 (1976) (negligence); Nakanishi v. Foster, 64 Wash. 2d
647, 393 P.2d 635 (1964) (negligence); City of La Crosse v. Schubert,
Schroeder & Assocs., 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1974) (strict
liability and negligence); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Fairbanks
Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973) (Pennsylvania
law) (strict liability).
The leading case upholding recovery in strict liability for eco-
nomic loss was Santor v. A & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965). The ruling was subsequently confined to consumer
cases in Spring Motors Distributors., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 98 N.J.
555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985). But cf Cinnaminson Township Bd. of
Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982) (uphold-
ing the recovery of the cost of replacing asbestos tile in a commercial
context).
Many of the cases sustaining liability for economic loss are no
longer authoritative or are subject to serious question: (1) the Massa-
chusetts decision in Omni Flying Club has been disapproved in subse-
quent opinions, see Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S. Co. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 404 Mass. 103, 533 N.E.2d 1350 (1989); (2)
the decisions under Michigan law in Feldman, Spence, and Southgate
have been superseded, see Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty's, Inc., 154
Mich. App. 634, 397 N.W.2d 853 (1986), appeal denied, 428 Mich.
874 (1987); (3) the decision under Minnesota law in Feeders has been
superseded, see Superwood Corp. v. Siempelkamp, 311 N.W.2d 159
(Minn. 1981); (4) the decisions under Ohio law in Mead and Conti-
nental Oil have been superseded, see Chemitrol Adhesives, Inc. v.
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American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624
(1989); (5) the Washington decisions in Berg and Nakanishi have been
overturned by statute, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(4), (6)
(Supp. 1989); and (6) the decisions under Wisconsin law in R & L
Grain and City of La Crosse are of questionable validity, see Wiscon-
sin Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 830 F.2d 1405
(7th Cir. 1987); Sunnyslope Grading Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Ris-
berg, 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989). In addition, there are
unresolved conflicts in the California decisions with respect to
negligence.
3. For the most part, state product liability statutes refer to
"property damage" or the equivalent without further elaboration. See
ALA. CODE § 6-5-501(2) (Supp. 1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
681(3) (1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-86-102, 16-116-102(5) (1987)
(harm to property); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-401(2) (1987); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
411.300(1) (Baldwin Supp. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600-2945
(1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,180 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 99B-1(3) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.900 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-1-32(1) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-9-10 (1987);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(6) (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
15-6 (1987). Some states exclude economic loss either expressly or by
implication. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572n (Supp. 1988) (exclud-
ing claim for "commercial loss" as between "commercial parties");
IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-2 (West Supp. 1988) (excluding claims
for "gradually evolving damage to property or economic loss from
such damage"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3302(d) (1983) (excluding
claim for "direct or consequential economic loss"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-719 (1989) (referring to "physical harm to property");
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:58C-l(b)(2) (West 1987) (referring to "physical
damage to property, other than to the product itself"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.71(B), (G), (M) (Anderson Supp. 1988) (referring
to "physical damage to property other than the product in question"
and excluding a broadly defined category of "economic loss"); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (referring to "physical
harm [to the user's] property"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 7.72.010(4), (6) (Supp. 1989) (excluding claim for "direct or conse-
quential economic loss" under the UCC). Two formulations are more
expansive. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-2800.53(5) (West Supp.
1989) (referring to "damage to the product itself and economic loss
arising from a deficiency in or loss of use of the product," but only to
the extent not covered by Warranty law); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
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§ 507-D:(1)(I) (1983) (referring to "property damage or other
damage").
The product liability statutes cover issues of varying scope. They
have received scant attention from the courts in resolving issues of
economic loss. There are, however, exceptions. See, e.g., Purvis v.
Consolidated Energy Prods. Co., 674 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1982) (inter-
preting the South Carolina statute's reference to "physical harm" to
exclude the failure of a structure to cure tobacco); Mac's Eggs, Inc. v.
Rite-Way Agric. Distribs., 656 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (inter-
preting the Indiana statute's requirement of "physical injury" to
exclude a malfunction in a feed system which led to losses of chickens
and a lower yield); Verdon v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363,
371, 446 A.2d 3, 8 (1982) (observing that the Connecticut statute per-
mitted recovery for damage to the product sold, but not for economic
loss); Washington Water Power Co. v. Graybar Elec. Co., 112 Wash.
2d 847, 774 P.2d 1199 (recognizing that Washington's statute disal-
lowed claims for economic loss but expressing uncertainty about the
scope of the economic loss concept), amended, 779 P.2d 697 (1989).
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